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Labor unions are active again - but this time as capitalists. The 
potential strength of union pension funds has long been noted,1 but 
until recently unions have held their stock passively or invested in 
union-friendly companies. In the 1990s, however, unions have 
become the most aggressive of all institutional shareholders. 2 In 
most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or proletarian plot in what 
unions are doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a 
1. See I'r:rER F. DRUCKER, THE PENSION FUND REvoLunoN (1996) (originally 
published as THE UNSEEN REvoLunoN: How PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME To 
AMERICA (1976)); JEREMY RlFK1N & RANDY BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN: 
PENSIONS, POLITICS, AND POWER IN THE 1980s (1978). 
2. See Joann S. Lublin, 'Poison Pills' Are Giving Shareholders a Big Headache, Union 
Proposals Assert, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1997, at Cl. For general discussions of labor unions' 
shareholder activism, see Aaron Bernstein, Labor Flexes Its Muscles - As a Stockholder, 
Bus. WK., July 18, 1994, at 79 (reporting that union-mounted proxy fights have quadrupled 
since 1992); Laura M. Litvan, Unions Take Stock in Companies, lNvEsroR's Bus. DAILY, 
Dec. 11, 1997, at 1 (discussing current union shareholder initiatives); Paul Sweeney, Clash by 
Proxy, AcRoss THE BoARD, May 1, 1996, at 21 (discussing labor union activism during the 
1996 proxy season). 
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model for a.Ily large institutional investor attempting to maximize 
return on capital. Unions, union pension funds, individual union 
members, and labor-oriented investment funds are using the 
corporate voting process to push for a wide variety of changes in 
corporate governance. These range from redemption of rights 
plans3 to implementation of confidential shareholder voting to caps 
on executive pay. 
This shareholder activism by unions requires a maj or 
realignment of the traditional ideologies of shareholder, worker, 
and manager. Managers traditionally were thought to represent 
shareholders' interests and unions were thought to represent 
workers'. Of course, a viewpoint that equates managers' and 
shareholders' interests is naive.4 Corporate scholars have long 
3. Rights plans are one of the most powerful antitakeover defenses available to a target 
company. See Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: 
When Is Using A Rights Plan Right?, 46 V AND. L. REv. 503, 505 (1993). Rights plans are 
discussed extensively in RANDALL S. TuoMAs & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANow & 
EINHORN ON PROXY CoNTESTS FOR CoRPORATE CONTROL § 20.02 (3d ed. Aspen L. & Bus. 
1998) (footnotes omitted): 
Almost one-half of America's major public companies have Rights Plans, or "poison 
pills" as they are often called, and the remaining companies could put them in place 
quickly if needed. These plans are expressly authorized by most states' corporate codes. 
While a variety of different plans have been dubbed poison pills, the Share Purchase 
Rights Plan {Rights Plan) is the most popular. Some of the co=on characteristics of 
this type of Rights Plan are briefly described here. 
Rights plans are usually created by a target company's board of directors without a 
stockholder vote. The board must authorize the creation and distribution to its co=on 
stockholders of a dividend of one right for each share of co=on stock they own. The 
right entitles the stockholder to purchase co=on or preferred stock of the issuing 
company or any potential acquiror. While initially the rights are transferable only with 
the co=on stock and are not exercisable, once a "triggering event" occurs, new rights 
certificates are distributed to the issuing company's stockholders and may be exercised. 
The board of directors of the issuing company reserves the power to redeem the 
rights for a certain period of time at a nominal price. This gives the board tremendous 
negotiating leverage with the bidder: if the bidder agrees to the board's terms, the board 
can stop the rights from becoming redeemable, avert the economic devastation that 
would be inflicted on the bidder, and permit the bidder to acquire the company. If the 
bidder does not agree to accept the board's demands, then the directors can use the 
Rights Plan to stop the offer from proceeding. 
Id. 
A new and more potent version of the rights plan includes what are co=only referred to 
as "dead hand" or "continuing director" provisions. These provisions permit only incumbent 
directors or their designates to redeem or eliminate the rights plan. These provisions make it 
impossible for an acquiror to take control of the company through a proxy contest and then 
have the new board of directors remove the rights plan. In the few decided cases testing the 
validity of these provisions, the courts have split over whether they should be upheld. Com­
pare Bank of New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (invali­
dating a continuing-director provision under New York law) with Invacare Corp. v. 
Healthdyne Tech. Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997) {upholding a continuing director 
provision under Georgia law); see also Shawn C. Lese, Note, Preventing Control from the 
Grave: A Proposal for Judicial Treatment of Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills, 96 
CoLUM. L. REv. 2175 {1996) (arguing that courts should invalidate these provisions). 
4. A viewpoint equating union and worker interests is similarly naive, as the union 
democracy literature has explored. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., UNION 
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emphasized a divergence between managers and shareholders.5 
Indeed, in the 1980s workers often aligned with managers against 
shareholders in thwarting hostile takeovers, depriving shareholders 
of substantial premiums in the process.6 Most empirical work has 
found that workers were not harmed by takeovers7 and so gained 
little from this alignment. In the 1990s, a historic shift has begun, as 
worker-shareholders prod other shareholders into holding 
management more accountable. Important changes in corporate 
governance have already resulted. To maintain its momentum, this 
realignment will require unions to modify their self-image as well. 
Unions, swept along by actions of their pension funds, increasingly 
will focus on the long-run health of corporations. If they do not, 
labor-shareholder activism may be a fad of the 1990s, doomed to 
fizzle. But the potential exists for fundamental change in both 
corporations and unions. 
Much of what the union shareholder is doing is familiar to other 
institutional shareholders - only the union sponsor is novel. For 
example, in 1997 unions sponsored several resolutions to redeem 
poison pills and to declassify corporate boards of directors -
classic issues of corporate governance - using Rule 14a-8,8 the 
traditional avenue for shareholders to place resolutions on the 
ballot at the annual meeting. Unions are also active in seeking 
changes in executive pay, an area a bit closer to labor interests and 
one in which institutional shareholder interest has been increasing 
recently. For example, a Teamsters' pension fund sponsored a 
shareholder resolution in General Electric's proxy statement for its 
1997 annual meeting to cap executive base salaries at $1 million.9 
DEMOCRACY (1956); Paul Jarley et al., A Structural Contingency Approach to Bureaucracy 
and Democracy in U.S. National Uniofll, 40 ACAD. OF MGMr. J. 831, 832-34 (1997). 
5. The classic work emphasizing the separation between shareholder ownership and 
management control of corporations is ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. � GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1934). 
6. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to Make 
Shareholder Proposals, 73 WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 10-11, on file 
with authors) ("During [the 1980s], unions generally supported corporate management in 
resisting hostile acquisitions by, among other things, pushing for stronger state antitakeover 
laws and accepting defensive employee stock ownership plans. Employee shareholders also 
supported a host of other antitakeover devices that insulated management from the 
consequences of poor performance. " (footnotes omitted)). 
7. For an excellent summary of these studies, see Roberta Romano, A Guide to 
Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 140-42 (1992) 
(summarizing several studies and finding that "middle management . . .  and not production 
plant employees [are the ones] whose ranks are slimmed down after acquisitions "). 
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997). 
9. See David Cay Johnston, Teamsters Are Challenging G.E. Chiefs Compensation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at D2. This proposal attracted nine percent of the votes cast at the 
annual meeting, leading Teamsters' officials to conclude that feelings among investors against 
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More startling are the innovative methods unions have 
developed to get corporations to listen to traditional shareholder 
complaints. Unions are at the cutting edge of corporate and 
securities law in getting their message out to other shareholders and 
corporate boards of directors. One example of such innovation is 
the Teamsters' widely publicized list of the "least valuable" 
corporate directors.10 Press attacks on directors are an unusual 
shareholder method of voicing displeasure, but the Teamsters' 
substantive complaint with the directors was one dear to 
shareholders: the directors were not maximizing firm value. A 
more important development is the number of labor-sponsored 
"floor proposals" submitted for a shareholder vote at annual 
meetings, sometimes independently of the company's proxy 
statement. The innovation with the greatest long-term potential to 
alter the balance of power between shareholders and management 
is mandatory amendment of corporate bylaws by shareholders. 
Unions have been at the forefront in the recent movement by 
shareholders to amend corporate bylaws to limit the authority of 
boards of directors on the sensitive issue of takeover defenses. 
Not all labor-shareholder activism involves a new-age alignment 
of shareholder and worker interests. Sometimes unions use their 
shareholder power simply as a new weapon to further unions' 
traditional organizing and collective-bargaining goals. Some of the 
shareholder activism certainly occurs at companies at which unions 
are concurrently engaged in contract negotiations or union 
organizing campaigns.11 Corporate management claims that most 
union shareholder activity is part of a "corporate campaign" 
designed to win other concessions for workers. Corporate 
management representatives have even asked the SEC to restrict 
unions' ability to submit shareholder proposals.12 For example, the 
high pay for executives is growing. See William M. Carley, GE Chairman Defends Pay, 
Stresses Quality, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1997, at A4. 
10. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Teamsters Hit a Nerve on Directors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
1996, at Dl {discussing the Teamsters' pension fund list of the 23 least valuable directors and 
its implications for corporate-governance reform). 
11. See Frank Swoboda, AFL-CIO Changing Its Tactics: Union to Expand Advertising, 
Corporate Campaigns Against Employers, WASH. PoST, Feb. 20, 1997, at C2 (reporting that 
the AFL-CIO announced plans to increase stockholder campaigns against a range of 
employers in the 1997 proxy season). 
12. See Stephen Baker, The Yelping over Labor's New Tactics, Bus. WK., Oct. 23, 1995, at 
75; see also Elizabeth Walpole-Hofmeister, Corporate Campaigns: Business Leaders Blast 
Union Tactics; House Hearings Planned For November, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 22, 
1995, at AA-1 (reporting that the American Trucking Association had sent a letter to the 
SEC asking that it change its rules to permit companies to refuse to include union-sponsored 
resolutions in proxy statements when they are submitted in the midst of a corporate 
campaign). 
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American Society of Corporate Secretaries and other management 
groups have urged the SEC to impose limits on unions that are 
using the shareholder-proxy process to increase their leverage at 
the collective bargaining table.13 Management's arguments to 
restrict labor unions' shareholder activism rest on the premise that 
unions are seeking to protect jobs and further other labor interests 
at the expense of the corporation and other shareholders. 
We argue, however, that much of the union-shareholder 
activism cannot be dismissed simply as an old dog's new tricks. In 
many cases, unions are trying to improve the financial performance 
of their pension funds, just like any other institutional investor. 
Between these two poles, we suspect that the goal behind some of 
the union-shareholder activity is to become more involved in 
strategic corporate decisions. In recent decades, unions have 
become increasingly frustrated at their lack of influence over basic 
corporate policy. Shareholder activism is a promising way of 
getting the attention of top management and the board of directors. 
In this article, we investigate the consequences of the new 
shareholder activism of unions. We claim that much union­
shareholder activity represents an alignment of shareholder and 
worker interests that attempts to prod management to increase the 
overall worth of the firm. At other times, the union shareholder 
seeks to benefit workers at the expense of other shareholders. But 
other shareholders are generally able to distinguish, on a case-by­
case basis, which hat the union shareholder is wearing. Without the 
support of other shareholders, the union shareholder cannot change 
the company. These are not worker-owned firms. This check on 
union-shareholder power - in addition to existing fiduciary checks 
on union-pension-fund activism and powerful market forces -
negate the need for any change in corporate or securities law to 
regulate union shareholders specifically. We therefore advocate no 
change in existing law. We do argue, however, that the alignment 
of union and other shareholders will have profound effects on both 
corporate governance and long-term union goals. 
We begin, in Part I, by describing two stories of union­
shareholder activism that illustrate some of the issues involved. 
Part II then outlines our theoretical framework. Here we 
distinguish union-shareholder initiatives designed to further unions' 
traditional organizing and collective bargaining goals from those 
13. See SEC Meets with Corporate Secretaries, INSIGHTS, June 1996, at 33, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Insite File. 
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that enhance unions' role as a participant in strategic corporate 
decisionmaking, a newer vision of the union. We also distinguish 
between activities of unions and their pension funds. 
In Part m, we use this framework to describe labor unions' 
current voting initiatives. Our hypothesis is that it is no accident 
that unions are at the cutting edge of innovative corporate law. 
Their desire for a more visible presence in corporate boardrooms 
requires innovation. From the labor perspective, unions have 
slowly withered as they focused on collective bargaining and relied 
on strikes to back their demands. From the corporate perspective, 
unions have remained peripheral players in the boardroom, despite 
their vast stock holdings, because traditional shareholder voting 
initiatives, particularly under Rule 14a-8, are largely ineffective 
methods for focusing shareholders and directors on a limited 
number of corporate-governance issues. Further, but more 
tentatively, we suspect that unions are less able than other 
institutional shareholders to exercise influence through informal, 
behind-the-scenes discussions. Unions recognize the need for new 
approaches - including approaches that do not reflexively regard 
efficiency and profitability as goals of "enemy" shareholders, and 
this has led them to become more creative in exploring new ways of 
exercising their voices as shareholders. 
Part IV evaluates how current legal and market forces regulate 
union-shareholder activism. We conclude that existing legal and 
market checks adequately constrain potential opportunistic union 
behavior, so that legal reform is unnecessary. We identify three 
forces that would check labor unions' efforts to act to further their 
members' interests at the expense of other shareholders: the 
fiduciary structure of Taft-Hartley union pension funds; the need to 
persuade other self-interested shareholders to vote for union 
initiatives; and the disciplinary power of capital markets, the 
market for corporate control, and product markets to constrain 
corporate conduct that deviates too far from maximizing 
shareholder profits. We conclude that these forces adequately limit 
labor unions' ability to expropriate more corporate value for their 
members, if they choose to pursue that course of action. 
Finally, in Part V and the Conclusion, we examine several 
different areas where unions have been active and look at how 
these checks have affected their actions. We suggest that while 
union-shareholder activism potentially could have long-lasting 
effects on unions' role in corporate governance, it will be a passing 
fad unless unions can garner other shareholders' support for their 
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platform. To do so, unions need to focus their shareholder voting 
initiatives in areas where they have special advantages in 
monitoring management. If unions can package the results of their 
research in proposals that emphasize to shareholders the ways in 
which the two groups' interests are aligned, then union-shareholder 
activism could be here to stay. 
I. Two STORIES OF UNION-SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
As we examine union-shareholder activism, a key question is 
whether unions use their rights as shareholders merely as a new 
tactic for pursuing old goals, or whether they are forging a new role 
for unions. Not surprisingly, we find that unions have both old and 
new objectives in mind. We seek, however, to avoid simplistically 
equating old union goals with harm to other shareholders, and new 
union goals with furtherance of shareholder interests. Unions can 
play either role, and either role can help or hinder other sharehold­
ers. We begin our analysis and illustrate some of its complexity 
with two stories of recent shareholder activity. 
A. The UFCW Floor Fights at Albertson's 
Albertson's is a major chain of grocery stores, operating some 
826 stores nationwide, concentrated in the western states. The 
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) has organized 
many of the stores and represents about forty percent of Albert­
son's retail employees.14 Albertson's more recently entered Ari­
zona. In 1989, it operated a single store in Yuma;15 as of January 
1997, it had thirty-four stores in Arizona.16 By 1996, UFCW Local 
99R had organized the Yuma store and was negotiating a collective 
contract there. More importantly, it was conducting a corporate 
campaign to urge Albertson's to recognize the UFCW as the bar­
gaining agent at some twenty-eight other stores in Arizona at which 
the union had obtained authorization cards from employees. 
UFCW is among the more successful unions at using the authoriza­
tion card-corporate campaign approach to organizing as an alterna-
14. See Nationwide Class Action Suit Targets Albertson's Pay Practices, Mistreatment of 
Workers, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 5712189. 
15. See Melanie Johnston, Supermarkets Feed Phoenix Glut, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 13, 
1989, at 66. 
16. See Albertson's Inc., 1997 SEC Form 10-K, at 5, available in EDGAR, Film No. 
97,576,545. The EDGAR database is available on LEXIS, on Westlaw, and at the SEC's 
homepage at <http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm>. 
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tive to traditional NLRB elections accompanied by recognitional 
picketing.17 
The national UFCW's corporate campaign against Albertson's 
included backing a number of lawsuits alleging violations of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act.18 In addition, Local 99R bought forty-three 
shares of stock in Albertson's and pursued its right as a shareholder 
to introduce resolutions on the floor of the 1996 annual shareholder 
meeting.19 Local 99R solicited the support of other Albertson's 
shareholders for a proposal on confidential shareholder voting.20 
The board of directors opposed the proposal. It emphasized that 
the cost to the union of its proxy solicitation exceeded the value of 
its forty-three shares, thus causing the board to believe that the 
union did not submit its proposal "in the interests of the stockhold­
ers," but rather to "pressure the Company to unionize its Arizona 
employees."21 Nevertheless, the proposal received considerable 
support of other shareholders, getting 21.4 % of the vote.22 
Local 99R increased the pressure on the Albertson's board by 
carrying its shareholder campaign to other companies. Six Albert­
son's board members were officers or directors of other companies 
as well. Local 99R bought stock in these other companies and of­
fered shareholder proposals at these other companies as well,23 on 
such issues as voting on future golden parachutes, declassifying the 
board, and redeeming the poison pill.24 The results of these share­
holder proposals are presented in Table 3. The votes received 
range from 0.1 % to 44.6%. 
The effect of the union-shareholder activism at Albertson's is 
unclear. The union did get votes on several of its proposals, but 
none received majority shareholder support. Most of Albertson's 
Arizona stores remain nonunion.25 In the 1997 proxy season, the 
17. See Laura M. Litvan, Can Unions Fit in New Economy?, INvEsToR's Bus. DAILY, 
Apr. 7, 1997, at Al. 
18. See Aaron Bernstein, This Union Suit Could Really Scratch, Bus. WK., Mar. 10, 1997, 
at 37. The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994). 
19. See Albertson's, Inc., Proxy Statement 29 (Apr. 25, 1996), available in EDGAR, F"tlm 
No. 96,401,613. 
20. See id. 
21. Id. at 30. 
22. See lNvEsroR REsPONSIBILITY REsEARCH Crn., SUMMARY oF 1996 U.S. SHARE-
HOLDER REsoLUTIONS 4 (1996) [hereinafter I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY]. 
23. See Albertson's, Inc., supra note 19, at 30. 
24. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 4. 
25. See, e.g., Food for Thought, SEA'ITLE TIMES, Feb. 24, 1997, at Dl, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, Seattn File (describing Local 99R's campaign to organize Albertson's grocery 
workers in Phoenix as unsuccessful). 
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UFCW has again targeted Albertson's and companies with inter­
locking directorates with corporate-governance proposals,26 so the 
battle continues. 
This story has several noteworthy points. The union's apparent 
goal was to increase its organizing power, a traditional union goal. 
The shareholder activity seemed to be a substitute for a strike. But 
the proposals were targeted at corporate-governance reforms that 
were not directly beneficial to narrow, worker-related union goals. 
The union seemed to attempt to ally itself with shareholders, albeit 
so far not completely successfully. The union introduced its propos­
als on the floor of the annual meeting, rather than through the com­
panies' proxy statements. The use of a floor fight was an innovative 
technique under corporate law, which usually assumes that annual 
shareholders' meetings simply rubber stamp management's 
agenda.27 The UFCW appeared to use this approach to gain a more 
visible presence in the Albertson's boardroom and to circumvent 
obstacles to gaining its objectives through traditional labor tactics. 
As such, these campaigns seem to reflect new union tactics in pur­
suit of old union goals. 
B. Teamsters' Pension Fund Bylaw Proposals at Fleming 
Companies, Inc. 
Fleming Companies, Inc., is one of the nation's largest food dis­
tributors. Its primary competitors include Kroger and Albertson's. 
Approximately half of its "associates" are unionized by one of four 
unions, including the Teamsters and the UFCW.28 On July 7, 1986, 
the company implemented a poison pill with a ten-year life, imped­
ing possible takeovers of the company.29 Both California Public 
Employees Retirement System (Ca1PERS)30 and the Council for 
26. See CoUNCIL OF lNsTL. !NvEsToRS LEITER, Mar. 14, 1997, at 2. 
27. See Mike Dorning, Big Investors See Corporate Clout Growing, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 14, 
1994, at Cl; see generally MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CoRPORATION 
chs. 9-10 {1976). 
28. See Fleming Cos., Inc., 1997 SEC Form 10-K, at 2, 8, 9, available in EDGAR, Fllm 
No. 97,560,649. 
29. See Fleming Cos., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement 26-27 (Mar. 12, 1996), available in 
EDGAR, Fllm No. 96,534,058. Tue original pill was strengthened on August 22, 1989. It was 
due to expire July 6, 1996. · 
30. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, A Top-10 List Not Too Many Care To Be On, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 1997, at DS. 
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Institutional Investors (CII)31 have listed Fleming Companies on 
their annual "worst companies" lists. 
In 1996, the Teamsters' General Fund used Rule 14a-8 to pro­
pose a shareholder resolution recommending that the company re­
deem its current poison pill and have an affirmative shareholder 
vote prior to adopting any future poison pill. The company in­
cluded this proposal in its proxy materials.32 Despite management's 
declared opposition to the proposal, sixty-four percent of the voting 
shareholders voted to support it.33 Nevertheless, less than two 
months later, Fleming's board of directors adopted a new poison 
ill 34 p . 
In 1997, the Teamsters' General Fund proposed that the share­
holders amend the company's bylaws to mandate that the board 
redeem the poison pill and to forbid the board from enacting an­
other without shareholder approval.35 After losing federal litiga­
tion aimed at keeping the proposal off the ballot, the board 
"voluntarily" terminated its current pill.36 Subsequently, 60.5% of 
the shareholders voted for the renewed Teamsters' resolution.37 
We flag several points of interest in this story. First, the union 
action seemed closely intertwined with that of its pension funds. 
The Teamsters' General Fund, sponsor of the shareholder propos­
als, apparently owns only sixty-five shares of Fleming stock.38 Vari­
ous Teamsters' pension funds are important shareholders at 
Fleming Companies, however, holding some 117,000 shares in 
1996.39 Second, while many Fleming workers are members of the 
Teamsters' Union, no special collective bargaining or organizing ac-
31. See John Authers, Investors' Council Renews Attack on U.S. Companies, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Oct. 8, 1996, at 31. The CII list compares company performance for up to the past 
five years to share performance of other companies in the same industry. 
32. See Fleming Cos., Inc., supra note 29, at 26-28. 
33. See Fleming Cos., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 885, at *14 
(Dec. 3, 1996). 
34. See id. 
35. See Ken Bertsch & Matt McGeary, Activists Keep Up the Heat in 1997; Attention 
Focuses on Merger Activity, Poison Pills, CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., Oct. 1996-Jan. 1997, at 
1. 
36. See Fleming Cos.: Board Decides to Terminate Company's Poison Pill Plan, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 19, 1997, at B4 [hereinafter Fleming Cos.]. 
37. See Fleming Shareholders Sack Defense, OMAHA WoRLD HERALD, May 1, 1997, at 
22. The Teamsters' anti-poison-pill resolution passed at the company's shareholder meeting 
held on April 30, 1997. See id. 
38. See Fleming Cos., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement 26 (Mar. 18, 1997), available in 
EDGAR, Fiim No. 97,558,298. 
39. See Fleming Shareholders Urge End to Poison Pill, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, May 2, 
1996, at 26. 
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tivity seemed to drive the shareholder proposals. The union goal 
seemed to be to remove management's defenses to a takeover so 
that its pension funds' stock could benefit. Third, the procedure 
was novel. In the first attempt, the union tried a standard precatory 
14a-8 proposal. Despite majority support from shareholders, the 
incumbent board ignored the message from that traditional avenue. 
The next year, the union turned to a highly innovative type of 
shareholder activity - urging a mandatory change in corporate by­
laws to restrict management's discretion to use a powerful antitak:e­
over defense. These new tactics may be directed at a new goal -
maximizing shareholder value. 
In summary, the two stories show the difficulty of categorizing 
union-shareholder activity. In the Fleming case, the union seemed 
to act in a new role as catalyst of general shareholder interests. But 
one suspects that the Teamsters picked on Fleming, out of the nu­
merous companies the fund had invested in that have poison pills, 
because of its hostile attitude towards the Teamsters. Still, the 
union succeeded in persuading other shareholders that its message 
served their goal of maximizing firm value. In Albertson's, by con­
trast, the union seemed to use shareholder pressure to further tradi­
tional organizing and collective bargaining goals. Its actions at the 
other companies, however, included an effort to redeem a poison 
pill- the identical effort in the Fleming case.40 Apparently, other 
shareholders remained suspicious of the union's effort, as its 
poison-pill and other proposals did not receive majority share­
holder support. 
II. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND UNION GOALS AND MEANS 
In this Part, we generalize the shareholder activism of unions 
and their pension funds by placing it in a framework of ends and 
means. We examine what is new and what is old about union­
shareholder activism. 
At the outset, we want to finesse two perennial questions about 
union activities in order to concentrate on the specific issue of 
union-shareholder activities. First, commentators often complain 
that union leaders do not serve their members but instead aggran­
dize their own positions. Just as difficulties in monitoring and other 
agency problems create slack between corporate managers and 
their shareholders, so too slack exists between union leaders and 
40. See also Lublin, supra note 2 (noting that unions have sponsored resolutions to re­
deem poison pills at 13 companies in 1997). 
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their members.41 In an article that emphasizes divergences between 
shareholders and managers, we do not want to assume naively that 
union leaders represent their members perfectly, particularly in the 
use of pension money. Certainly, unions have often been accused 
of misusing their members' pension funds.42 It may turn out that 
pension money spent on shareholder resolutions and associated liti­
gation is not a good investment.43 Union members may be better 
off with lower dues or lower pension costs than with the share­
holder activism. On the other hand, spending union or pension 
money to pursue rights aggressively as shareholders seems a trivial 
problem compared to siphoning funds to Las Vegas casinos. Or, to 
put the matter in corporate law language, union-shareholder activ­
ity at most raises duty-of-care problems, not duty-of-loyalty 
problems. 
The second issue we wish to clarify and then finesse concerns 
unions and overall shareholder profitability. Our thesis argues that 
unions and their pension funds are aligning with other shareholders 
to create more efficient governance structures for corporations. 
The skeptic might wonder whether this lion-laying-with-lambs the­
sis is plausible. The empirical evidence shows that, overall, unions 
reduce profits that can be distributed to shareholders.44 This differs 
from the claim that unions are inefficient, and· considerable evi­
dence suggests that unions enhance productivity, both by shocking 
management into better practices and by helping to solve collec­
tive-goods problems in the workplace.45 Thus, overall unions may 
enlarge a corporation's pie but then grab an even larger slice. 
These two faces of unionism were documented by the influential 
41. See Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union 
Contro� 1992 U. !LL. L. REv. 367 (comparing union member-leader relationship with corpo­
rate shareholder-manager relationship). 
42. See ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, RoBusr UNIONISM 244-45, 248 (1991); Julius G. Getman, 
Public Policy Implications of BRISA, 68 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 473, 475 (1994) (stating that "the 
misuse of pension funds is one of the greatest areas of union corruption"). 
43. See infra text accompanying notes 157-70 (discussing the inconclusive evidence on 
whether shareholder corporate-governance proposals improve firm performance). 
44. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 181 (1984) 
("Though exceptions can be found, unionization is more often than not associated with lower 
profitability."); BARRY T. HmsCH & JoHN T. ADDISON, THE EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF UN· 
IONS 211 (1986) ("[A]ll studies of which we are aware find unionism to be associated with 
lower profits."). 
45. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 44, at 169 ("[M]ost studies of productivity find 
that unionized establishments are more productive than otherwise comparable nonunion es­
tablishments."); HmsCH & ADDISON, supra note 44, at 215 ("The collective voice model has 
rightly emphasized that unionism need not necessarily detract from productivity, and this is 
an important finding in itself. What is in doubt is the generality and robustness of the unions­
raise-productivity thesis."). 
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labor economists Richard Freeman and James Medoff in their well­
known book, What Do Unions Do?46 
We avoid taking sides in a general debate over unions by focus­
ing on a new and limited activity of unions and their pension funds 
- that of shareholder activist. Even if unions traditionally reduce 
shareholder profits, union-shareholder activism can enlarge the cor­
porate pie without reducing the shareholding slice. As we discuss in 
detail later, the limited available evidence suggests that union­
shareholder activism may improve profitability for all shareholders. 
Thus, other shareholders can applaud and follow union-shareholder 
activism because it increases their own investment return, even if 
they do not support the overall union agenda because it would 
lower their return. 
A. Traditional Union Functions and Weapons 
Traditional business unions have three basic functions and two 
related weapons to help achieve their goals. First, unions organize 
workers at nonunion firms. Second, once organized, unions bargain 
with management. Third, once a collective bargaining agreement is 
negotiated, unions monitor management to ensure that it complies 
with the agreement, usually by processing worker complaints 
through a grievance arbitration system. To achieve its goals, unions 
strike and picket recalcitrant firms: · 
It is worth emphasizing that in the key area of collective bar­
gaining, a union has two methods of obtaining the most favorable 
contract for workers. First, of course, the union demands a bigger 
slice of the pie, arguing that the employer should offer higher 
wages, more benefits, and better working conditions. Second, how­
ever, collective bargaining attempts to increase the size of the pie 
by trading particular items to the highest-valued user. This is some­
times called win-win bargaining or value-added unionism.47 This 
dual aspect of unionism will be a key feature of our analysis of the 
union as shareholder. 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was drafted with 
traditional union functions and weapons in mind. First, the Act ac-
46. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 44; see also Richard B. Freeman & James L. 
Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, PuB. !NrEREST, Fall 1979, at 69. 
47. See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up the 
Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 827 (1996) (arguing that existing 
labor law impedes newer forms of voice and various modes of communication between labor 
and management by constraining the groups to have a primarily adversarial relationship, and 
making suggestions as to how labor law should be changed to promote the voice aspect of 
unionism). 
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tively promotes the union functions of organization, collective bar­
gaining, and grievance arbitration, while allowing workers free 
choice in whether to be represented by a union.48 Second, labor 
laws regulate the traditional economic weapons - the strike and 
the picket sign - in a variety of ways. A major regulatory principle 
provides that the government should remain neutral in the eco­
nomic battle between management and labor.49 The relative eco­
nomic strength of union and management, rather than the views or 
preferences of government officials, is supposed to determine the 
outcome of collective bargaining. On the other hand, striking and 
picketing are subject to detailed regulations.so In particular, the 
secondary boycott provisions try to prevent unions from dragging 
neutral employers into the fray.s1 
In recent years, unions have become increasingly frustrated with 
the NLRA and with their own declining importance in the Ameri­
can economy and society. Traditional business unionism no longer 
seems to work. The former president of the AFL-CIO even pub­
licly called for a repeal of the NLRA,s2 and others emphasize its 
uselessness.s3 In the face of a hostile Congress, however, labor law 
reform is unlikely. Thus, unions must find ways to work within the 
current framework and to avoid obstacles with new tactics. The 
new president of the AFL-CIO, John Sweeney, has emphasized the 
need for new thinking and new action by the labor movement.S4 
B. The Union Corporate Campaign 
In the last twenty years or so, new union tactics have left labor 
law regulation behind. Rather than relying solely on strikes and 
picketing as the means of achieving their aims, unions increasingly 
have resorted to a wide array of tactics. The umbrella term "union 
corporate campaign" is now used to describe this broad range of 
new tactics. 
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 {1994). 
49. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 232 (1990); Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Ar· 
gument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 
HARv. L. REv. 1662, 1675 {1983)). 
50. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158{b){4), (7), 158{d), 163 {1994). 
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). 
52. See Harry Bernstein, Creativity Needed to Stem Unions' Decline, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
1989, at pt IV, 1. 
53. See Martin J. Morand, Canada: Our Model?, MoNTHLY REv., June 1990, at 40, 41-42. 
54. See Aaron Bernstein, Sweeney's Blitz, Bus. WK., Feb. 17, 1997, at 56. 
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The union corporate campaign was pioneered by Ray Rogers 
when the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union 
(ACTWU) attempted to organize J.P. Stevens in the late 1970s.55 
Among the many tactics used, which included massive media pub­
licity and consumer boycotts, ACTWU and sympathetic church 
groups filed numerous shareholder proposals with J.P. Stevens. 
None of those proposals received more than 9.1 % of the vote.56 
Another tactic was to isolate Stevens's management by pressuring 
its outside board members. During the campaign, three outside di­
rectors resigned to avoid adverse publicity at their home compa­
nies.57 The campaign succeeded in getting J.P. Stevens to bargain 
with the union. As part of the settlement, ACTWU promised not 
to engage in further corporate campaign tactics at the company.ss 
At its broadest and blandest, the term union corporate campaign 
means any union tactics, other than traditional strikes and picket­
ing, used to pressure management to change some behavior.59 Usu­
ally, the term implies a coordinated campaign using several tactics, 
ranging from consumer boycotts and public-relations schemes to 
proxy contests and disruption of the corporation's dealings with 
creditors and lenders. 60 
Management groups define union corporate campaigns in less 
benign terms. In a 1995 press release, for example, the American 
Trucking Association called on Congress to investigate corporate 
55. See Judith Kenner Thompson, Union Use of Public Interest Proxy Resolutions, LAB. 
STUD. J., Fall 1988, at 40, 46. 
56. See id. at 50 tbl.1. Most of the resolutions in the J.P. Stevens cases concerned the 
ability of the corporation to remain profitable, given its disregard of labor law, affirmative 
action policies, and safety and health regulations. See id. at 57. 
57. See id. at 46. 
58. See Stanley J. Brown & Alyse Bass, Corporate Campaigns: Employer Responses to 
Labor's New Weapons, 6 LAB. LAW. 975, 988-89 (1990); Joel H. Siegal, Power in the Nineties: 
An Analysis of the Management of Pension Funds for the Attainment of Union and Public 
Interest Goals, 1987 DET. C.L. REv. 673, 681 (describing the terms of the settlement between 
J.P. Stevens and ACTWU). 
59. See Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto, Union Corporate Campaigns: An Assessment, 
43 INnus. & LAB. REL. REv. 505, 506-07 (1990); Herbert R. Northrup, Union Corporate 
Campaigns and Inside Games as a Strike Form, 19 EMPLOYEE REr.. LJ. 507, 507-13 (1994) 
(emphasizing corporate campaigns as a substitute for traditional strikes). See generally 
CHAru.Es R. PERRY, UNION CoRPORATE CAMPAIGNS (1987). 
60. In a 1985 publication, the AFL-CIO listed 10 tactics that could be used in a corporate 
campaign: (1) building coalitions with other labor and non-labor groups; (2) public relations 
activities; (3) legislative initiatives; (4) appeals to regulatory agencies; (5) legal actions; (6) 
consumer actions; (7) pressuring lenders and creditors; (8) threats to withdraw pension fund 
assets; (9) stockholder actions; and (10) in-plant actions. See INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPT., 
AFL-CIO, DEVELOPING NE W TACTICS: WINNING WlTii CoORDINATED CoRPORATE CAM­
PAIGNS 4-10 (1985). 
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campaign tactics, declaring that such campaigns' purpose was to 
damage the company: 
The purpose of a union corporate campaign is to damage a company's 
business, trade and reputation in order to pressure the company into 
concessions during a labor dispute or organizing drive. Such cam­
paigns typically include carefully orchestrated tactics such as suspi­
ciously-timed complaints to government agencies, consumer boycotts, 
shareholder resolutions, and harassment of company officers, direc­
tors and customers. 61 
The Association proposed, among other things, that the SEC refuse 
to include any union-sponsored shareholder resolutions in annual 
proxy statements if an organizing campaign or collective bargaining 
was imminent.62 
The wide variety of goals and tactics used makes it difficult to 
characterize corporate campaigns. Often, a corporate campaign 
uses new tactics to pursue the traditional goals of organizing or col­
lective bargaining. The new tactics are simply a complement or 
substitute for the traditional tactics of striking and picketing. 63 In 
these situations, unions engaged in a corporate campaign often self­
consciously use warlike rhetoric, with management as the enemy.64 
In other cases, the goals in a corporate campaign seem new. 
Some scholars believe that the union corporate campaign has arisen 
as unions try to influence strategic business decisions of top man­
agement. 65 Unions may also use various corporate-campaign tac­
tics, however, in an effort to encourage management to listen to the 
union. Corporate-governance issues are not mandatory subjects of 
collective bargaining,66 so management listens to unions' opinions 
or statements on these subjects only voluntarily. When viewed in 
this light, some union-shareholder proposals may appear to be an 
61. See Business Leaders Attack Union "Corporate Campaign" Tactics; Call for Congres· 
sional Inquiry, AMERICAN TRUCKING AssocIATIONS NEWS RELEASE (American 'Ilucking 
Assns., Alexandria, Va.), Sept. 21, 1995. 
62. See id. For a defense against charges that corporate campaigns constitute disloyalty 
for NLRA purposes, see Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and tlze Corporate Cam­
paign, 73 B.U. L. REv. 291 (1993). 
63. Jarley and Maranto use this approach, organizing corporate campaigns into three 
types: organizing, strike complement, and strike substitute. See Jarley & Maranto, supra 
note 59, at 507-10. 
64. See Northrup, supra note 59, at 519 ("Union literature is couched in emotionally 
charged rhetoric and fighting or warlike terminology both in corporate campaign and in in­
side game activities in order to create and to maintain an atmosphere of conflict."). 
65. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS 195-97 (1994). 
66. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 344 n.1 (1958) ( defin· 
ing the scope of mandatory subjects, including "'rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or 
other conditions of employment"' (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994))). 
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attempt to work within the constraints of securities law, and to 
avoid the limits of labor law, to gain management's ear on a wider 
range of topics. Management's willingness to listen will depend in 
part on whether other shareholders support the union. In this situa­
tion, unions are more likely to emphasize cooperative strategies. 
C. Union-Shareholder Activity - New Tactics or New Role? 
Union-shareholder activity sometimes serves old union goals. 
Often shareholder activity is part of a corporate campaign, used 
along with other tactics, to strengthen a union's collective-bargain­
ing position. Generally, one might think such shareholder activism 
comes at the expense of other shareholders. Shareholder resolu­
tions to pressure boards of directors to take union-favorable stances 
in collective bargaining may be an example. But, as we observed 
earlier,67 unions do, in the course of collective bargaining, attempt 
to enlarge the overall pie as a means of getting a larger slice for 
workers. Using shareholder tactics can have pie-enlarging effects as 
well, even when the ultimate goal is to improve the workers' lot 
through collective bargaining. Attacks on poison pills68 or exces­
sive executive salaries in the midst of collective bargaining might fit 
in this category. 
In other cases, unions seem to be using their shareholder power 
to forge a new role for themselves - becoming important players 
in the structure and strategic decisionmaking of the firm. In this 
new role, unions can further shareholders' interests as well as work­
ers' interests. For example, unions can help corporations make effi­
cient tradeoffs by representing workers' voices in collective 
decisions.69 But unions, in their new strategic mode, could decrease 
overall firm value by needlessly delaying painful decisions. In 
short, there is no one-to-one relation between union goals and 
shareholder interests. 
Still, to be successful, union-shareholder activism must gain the 
support of other shareholders. This is most likely to occur when 
unions embrace a goal of maximizing firm value - clearly a new 
way of thinking for some unions. Other shareholders are naturally 
suspicious of unions' motives, and union-shareholder activism will 
67. See supra section II.A. 
68. See John M. Bizjak & Christopher J. Marquette, Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark 
and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills (Jan. 1997) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (observing that shareholder activism through 
poison-pill-recession proposals can be an effective form of managerial oversight and corpo­
rate governance). 
69. See generally FREEMAN & MEooFF, supra note 44. 
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remain quixotic unless the proposals plainly attempt to maximize 
overall :firm value, rather than promote narrow union interests.1° 
An alignment of union and shareholder interests sounds unreal­
istic at first blush. The last foray of unions into corporate-govern­
ance issues occurred in the 1980s, . when unions were active 
supporters of state legislation to thwart takeovers.71 Management 
of large corporations also favored such statutes. The standard cor­
porate law view of such legislation is that it protects managers of 
large corporations and harms shareholders,72 who are prevented 
from receiving the benefit of higher share prices that result when 
corporate ownership is traded to higher-value users. In retrospect, 
takeover activity generally did not harm rank-and-file workers, and 
the alignment of unions with management against shareholders may 
be seen by unions today as a mistake. In the shareholder activism 
of the 1990s, unions have changed their alignment, creating infor­
mal coalitions with shareholders against management on certain 
issues. 
Why have unions shifted toward a position of maximizing share­
holder value? We suggest that there are at least four reasons why 
labor unions want to take a lead role in improving corporate­
governance structures. First, union members have significant :firm.­
specific human-capital investments in the firms where they work 
and thus are residual claimants of these :firms.73 Second, unions 
have special monitoring abilities and can create value for other 
shareholders through their policing of the agency costs of equity. 
Third, unions are outsiders to the traditional corporate-governance 
system and do not suffer many of the conflicts of interest that side­
line or severely hamper other shareholders' activism. Finally, and 
more tentatively, if labor union membership is aging, it would be 
appropriate for unions to focus more of their efforts on improving 
70. This conclusion corresponds with the findings of Judith Kenner Thompson's study of 
union proxy resolutions during 1975-1978. See Thompson, supra note 55. Although the reso­
lutions were uniformly unsuccessful, Thompson notes that resolutions specifically worded to 
elicit shareholder support for a labor dispute received very low levels of support, while reso­
lutions worded to address concerns shared by all shareholders received relatively higher rates 
of support. See id. at 56-57. 
71. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
72. See ROBERTA RoMANo, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 57-59 (1993) 
(noting that antitakeover statutes politically were supported by and served managers of large 
corporations); see also Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales 
for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STET­
SON L. REv. 23, 31-36 (1991) (noting that managers also supported nonshareholder-constitu­
ency statutes). 
73. See Bernard Black, Corporate Law and Residual Claimants (Dec. 1997) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
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the value of the retirement component of worker compensation and 
therefore to engage in shareholder activism as a means of raising 
the value of pension assets held by workers. 
Unions have a greater incentive than most shareholders to mon­
itor management rather than free ride on monitoring by others. 
Workers are locked into the firm with firm-specific human-capital 
investments, while shareholders have diversified portfolios with rel­
atively little fixed interest in a single firm. Workers thus have 
greater incentives to monitor management to ensure that the firm 
remains healthy. If unions could harness this incentive and ability 
to monitor and credibly relay their information to other sharehold­
ers, or to the independent directors on the board, a major role for 
unions could develop.74 In short, if workers want to protect their 
residual claims on these firms, they have significant incentives to 
become activist shareholders and to reform inefficient corporate­
governance systems. 
Unions have the capability and incentive to play a beneficial 
monitoring role for shareholders. This capability arises from their 
unique access to information, which comes from their day-to-day 
involvement with the corporation. Unions, in representing work­
ers, regularly assemble and analyze information about the firm 
from a variety of internal and external sources.75 Unions routinely 
collect and evaluate general information regarding corporate per­
formance, industry trends and forecasts, as well as information that 
is specific to contractual provisions. Many national and interna­
tional unions maintain research departments for this purpose. In 
addition, most unions have on staff a number of professionals, in­
cluding economists, lawyers, accountants, and human resources spe­
cialists, to assist them in their work.76 
The informational expertise of unions may be most useful in 
scrutinizing executive-compensation decisions. Increasing competi-
74. One example of this is the UFCW's successful "information relay" portion of its cor­
porate campaigns. The UFCW collects information from employees regarding employers' 
legal infractions and then "forwards" that information to news reporters, lawyers, or the 
appropriate regulatory authorities. See Bernstein, supra note 18, at 37. Recently, the UFCW 
has begun employing its own lawyers to pursue these claims. See id. Successful union moni­
toring of this type, conducted on behalf of shareholders, could eliminate or greatly reduce 
many types of corporate fraud. 
75. Because unions collect information regarding employee preferences as part of these 
activities, their information-collection and communication activities may actually enhance 
productivity levels within the firm. For example, unions may communicate the "optimal" mix 
of compensation for employees, and thereby reduce turnover. See FREEMAN & MEooFF, 
supra note 44, at 15. 
76. See Paul F. Clark & Lois S. Gray, Union Administration, in THE STATE OF THE 
UNIONS 175, 184 (George Strauss et al. eds., 1991). 
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tion, and the resultant emphasis on cost-cutting and increasing pro­
ductivity, has forced unions to become well versed in the myriad 
compensation mechanisms that directly tie worker productivity to 
corporate performance, as well as those that can be used to cut la­
bor costs. As a result, unions negotiate over the establishment of 
compensation systems for their workers that have some of the same 
features - for example, stock plans, bonuses, profit-sharing mecha­
nisms, and deferred compensation - as executive-compensation 
plans. 
Unions also have access to information regarding the day-to-day 
activities of firms. To the extent that day-to-day operations reflect 
corporate policies and strategies defined by directors and officers, 
unions have information regarding the effect of those strategies "on 
the floor." Moreover, unions' presence in the firm gives them an 
opportunity not available to most shareholders to assess the extent 
to which compensation systems reward supervisors, managers, and 
officers for short-term, as opposed to long-term, improvements in 
productivity and decreases in operating costs. Unions often know 
when morale is good or whether a flashy new project is a 
boondoggle. 
Even in cases where unions do not have unique access to infor­
mation, they can help other shareholders by their willingness to 
challenge management. Union shareholders are rarely part of in­
terlocking directorates and more generally are outside the usual 
"old boy" network of corporate investing that can impede corpo­
rate pension funds or financial institutions from opposing manage­
ment. With less social capital at risk, unions can be the point of 
attack in ways that outside directors and certain other institutional 
investors cannot when the top management of a particular corpora­
tion becomes self-serving.77 For example, outside directors who are 
CEOs of another corporation may be unwilling to raise serious 
questions about executive compensation for fear of having the spot­
light turned on their own pay one day. Other institutional share­
holders may have conflicts of interest that stop them from raising 
important corporate-governance issues.78 But once a union share-
77. For a description and critique of this view, see Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund 
Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 CoLuM. L. REv. 795, 796 & n.3 (1993) 
("[M]anagers of corporate pension funds and financial institutions have other business rela­
tions with issuers that are thought to generate conflicts of interest preventing them from 
opposing corporate management."). 
78. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811, 826-27 (1992) (describing the various conflicts of interest that 
arise amongst institutional investors in opposing management actions); see also Sweeney, 
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holder raises the issue, other institutional investors may concur and 
outside directors may be compelled to act in the overall interest of 
shareholders. 
On the other hand, other shareholders may suspect that unions 
are willing to sacrifice their shareholder stake for their worker in­
terests. Just as public pension funds face distinctive conflicts that 
limit the effectiveness of their shareholder activism,79 so do unions 
and union pension funds. Even standard corporate-governance 
proposals issued by a union are given extra scrutiny by corporate 
management.80 Some observers have detected, however, greater 
willingness recently by other institutional shareholders to take 
union-shareholder proposals at face value.81 
Finally, we tentatively suggest that increasing levels of union­
shareholder activism may be due in part to a shift in the age compo­
sition of the unions. If the age distribution of labor unions is getting 
older, as statistical evidence suggests it is,82 unions likely will place 
increased emphasis on retirement conditions, employer contribu­
tions, and other pension-related matters. Unions face strategic 
choices as to how best to provide these benefits for their constitu­
ents. One option is to rely on traditional bargaining approaches to 
secure improvements in those benefits. Another is to supplement 
these approaches with shareholder activism, given its potential for 
improving shareholder value both through the adoption of share­
holder proposals and through negotiation with corporate boards.83 
supra note 2, at 25 ("[U]nions are barging into places where other institutional shareholders 
have been treading softly."). 
79. Roberta Romano has emphasized the conflicts that public pension funds have in 
monitoring management See Romano, supra note 77. 
80. "When [unions] voice opposition to poison pills, classified boards, cumulative voting, 
and, increasingly, pay-for-performance of top executives . . .  'companies are looking under 
the four comers of [union] documents trying to interpret labor's true agenda.'" Sweeney, 
supra note 2, at 21 (quoting John Richardson, Deputy Director of Research for the Laborers' 
International Union of North America); see also id. at 23 (discussing Investor Responsibility 
Research Center attorney Patrick McGum's claim that because the labor pension funds fre­
quently have a "bifurcated agenda," they are often treated with more distrust than other 
shareholders). 
81. Jon Lukomnik, City of New York deputy comptroller for pensions and overseer of 
some $60 billion in city employees' funds, was quoted as saying: "If [Taft-Hartley fund] pro­
posals meet our written guidelines, we do not look at the sponsorship. We deal with the 
substance of the resolutions." Id. at 25. 
82. Older workers are more likely to be union members than younger workers. See 
Union Members: Who They Are, Where They Work, and What They Earn, MONTHLY LAB. 
REv., May 1996, at 42. For an analysis of conflicting empirical studies of age as a determinate 
of unionism, see HmsCH & AnmsoN, supra note 44, at 58-59. 
83. The potential for differences in opinion as to the appropriate strategy was revealed in 
the recent election for Teamsters' president. James P. Hoffa emphasized negotiation over 
specific early retirement provisions and a maintenance of shareholder activism, while Ron 
Carey advocated increased attention to corporate-governance activities and adoption of a 
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This possible motive seems especially powerful given the recent 
shift away from defined-benefit plans towards defined-contribution 
plans. 84 As a result, even though many union plans are still of the 
defined-benefit type, fund performance, in addition to the ability of 
their unions to negotiate greater employer-contribution levels and 
other retirement provisions, now increasingly influences members' 
benefits. This will add to unions' incentives to improve corporate­
governance systems and to increase shareholder value. 
Even if unions ultimately are unable to form a complete alliance 
with institutional investors, union-shareholder activism may serve 
the long-term interests of unions. For many years, unions have be­
come increasingly irrelevant to major corporate decisions. They are 
simply ignored. Shareholder activism is one way to get the atten­
tion of the board of directors. Even if individual union-shareholder 
proposals do not receive a majority of shareholders' votes or em­
barrass management into changing its ways - and most do not -
these proposals do attract attention. Boards of directors will be­
come aware again of unions, which could be in the long-run interest 
of unions. 
A key question in union-shareholder activism is whether and 
how the strategies of unions and their pension funds can and should 
be linked.85 Public pension funds are among the fastest-growing 
equity holders in this country.86 Workers are becoming capitalists. 
number of pension-fund-related reforms. See Christine Williamson, Pension Key in Team· 
sters Election, PENSIONS & lNvEsrMENTS, Nov. 11, 1996, at 3. Differences in strategies among 
unions, particularly in the area of corporate governance, were revealed when the United 
Auto Workers, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and the 
United Steelworkers of America began discussing their proposed merger. See Barry B. Burr, 
Union of Pension Issues?: Merging Labor Groups Differ on Corporate Governance, PEN· 
SIONS & lNvEsrMENTS, Aug. 7, 1995, at 3. 
84. In 1977, union members' pension programs were more likely to be defined-benefit 
plans, in which a pension level is specified and payments by the company are geared toward 
maintaining this level. See FREEMAN & MEooFF, supra note 44, at 68. Of union private­
pension plans, 89% were of the defined benefit type, compared to 35% of nonunion plans. 
See id. Since that time, there has been a marked shift toward defined contribution plans. 
See, e.g., William E. Even & David A. MacPherson, Why Did Male Pension Coverage Decline 
in the 1980s?, 41 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 439, 441-42 (1994); Alan L. Gustman et al., The 
Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A Survey of the Literature, 41 !Nous. & LAB. REL. 
REv. 417, 435 (1994). These plans specify the company's payments, while the investment 
success of the fund determines the benefits. Defined-contribution plans also increasingly are 
used as a supplement to defined-benefit plans. See id. at 435. For example, in 1996 the 
Teamsters' Union, which oversees 170 defined-benefit pension plans, began a national 401(k) 
plan as a supplemental savings plan. In order to obtain coverage, Teamsters' members' em­
ployers will have to agree in contract negotiations to include the 401(k) as a benefit. See 
Christine Williamson, Teamsters Start National 401 (k) Plan; 1 Million Workers to Be Eligible, 
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 29, 1996, at 1. 
85. In our discussion, we will distinguish the actions of unions and their pension funds 
whenever possible, although it is not always possible for us to peek behind the scenes. 
86. See Black, supra note 78, at 827. 
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Many observers have speculated for years about the potential 
power of pension funds to further worker goals.s7 Professor 
William Simon, however, is skeptical of the ability of pension funds 
to help corporate campaigns with traditional goals of organizing or 
bargaining with a particular employer.ss Simon notes that the pen­
sion funds are diversified, and he concludes that their power could 
be brought to bear on a particular firm only if coordinated by labor 
federations with strong central contro1.s9 Such federations do not 
exist in the United States.9o 
Professor Simon suggests a "more modest" role for pension 
funds - to develop a coordinating institution that could research 
companies, recommend votes on contested shareholder voting is­
sues, and field candidates for boards.91 Simon's proposal for insti­
tutional investors resembles that made by Professors Gilson and 
Kraakman,92 and put into practice by companies such as Institu­
tional Shareholder Services. Simon calls this role "more modest" 
because it would have little direct effect on organizing or collective 
bargaining at individual companies.93 But this role is indeed vision­
ary and powerful if it would cause corporate boards to notice union 
goals and values - even if stated at a vague level of generality. 
In the next section, we analyze in some detail the new methods 
that unions are using to bring their message to fellow shareholders 
or the board of directors. Unions, rather than other shareholders, 
have been at the forefront of these innovations. ·we suggest 
throughout that it is no accident that unions are being creative here. 
Unions' necessity may be the mother of invention. Institutional in­
vestors increasingly are using informal means to communicate with 
management.94 Companies suspicious of unions' motives may not 
87. See RlFKIN & BARBER, supra note 1. 
88. See William H. Simon, The Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism, 14 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 270 (1993). 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An 
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991). 
93. See Simon, supra note 88, at 270. 
94. Some institutional investors, particularly large pension funds, are using the proxy pro· 
cess as a "bargaining chip" in their efforts to negotiate with management over issues related 
to firm performance or corporate governance. For example, in the 1995 proxy season, 
CalPERS, New York City Employee's Retirement System (NYCERS), the New York City 
Teachers' Retirement Systems, and the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) delayed 
announcement of the firms they had targeted for activism until after they held talks with top 
management. See Alan L. Dye & Gregory W. Hair, Preparing for the Annual Meeting and 
Shareholder Activism, in POSTGRADUATE CoURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw 349, 385 
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be as willing, however, to negotiate informally with unions regard­
ing corporate-governance issues.95 If unions are excluded from this 
informal network, they may find it necessary to rely on more formal 
mechanisms, such as shareholder resolutions, in order for the 
boards of directors to hear unions' "shareholder voice." 
ill. LABOR'S SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND CORPORATE LAW 
Labor groups have launched an unprecedented variety of voting 
initiatives at companies across the nation in the past few years. In 
this Part, we discuss the different methods that labor is using in 
these initiatives and the legal issues they raise. We aim to convince 
the corporate specialist that these union initiatives are sophisti­
cated, important, and new. Our overall message is that these union­
led techniques should not be viewed as ploys to enhance labor's 
share of the corporate pie, but rather as techniques that generally 
increase incentives of management to improve firm efficiency. 
We begin by discussing labor-shareholder proposals made pur­
suant to Rule 14a-8. These proposals take two forms: traditional 
corporate-governance proposals, discussed in section III.A, and the 
more powerful, binding bylaw amendments, which are the topic of 
(ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials No. SB-09, 1996). The groups submitted proposals if 
the company did not provide a satisfactory response or if negotiations failed. See id. 
95. In general, larger, established pension funds may be more successful than unions in 
getting companies to negotiate over their concerns. See id. at 385. The size of funds such as 
CalPERS may provide them with an ability to trigger negotiations without first submitting 
proposals. Some have noted that the decline in activism by large pension funds during the 
1996 season was in part due to their interest in - and ability to use - direct negotiations. 
See John C. Wilcox, An Investor Relations Perspective on the SEC Communications Rules, in 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND CoMPENSATION RULES ch. 14 (2d ed. 1997), re­
printed in FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MERGERS AND AcQUismoNs: A NE W  ERA 571, 577 
(PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-973, 1997). Getting management to 
discuss key issues with investors other than established, large pension funds may require 
them first to submit a proposal. See Vmeeta Anand, Funds Flexing Muscles Early in Proxy 
Battles, PENSIONS & !NvEsTMENTS, Mar. 17, 1997, at 20 ("But without filing these proposals 
in the first place, investors find it hard to get attention." (quoting Douglas G. Cogan, Investor 
Responsibility Research Ctr.)). 
Unlike many other investors, labor groups also face a significant amount of skepticism 
and suspicion when submitting proposals. Management initially reacted to increased union­
shareholder activism by labeling the proposals submitted as "not real" proposals, but instead 
part of a campaign to force management to concede on issues related to collective bargain­
ing. See Michael W. Goroff, Recent Developments in Proxy Contests, in DoINo DEALS 1995, 
at 347, 372-73 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-711, 1995). Although 
today more companies appear willing to discuss issues raised by labor groups - as suggested 
by the number of proposals withdrawn after negotiations in the 1997 season - some still 
allege that unions submitting proposals have a "hidden agenda." See, e.g., Lublin, supra note 
2 (describing the current battle between May Department Stores and the Union of Needle­
trades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE), in which the company alleges that 
UNITE submitted its poison pill measure - a proposal to amend the bylaws - solely to 
advance the union's own agenda). 
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section III.B. Section III.C looks at labor's submission of share­
holder resolutions directly at the annual shareholders' meeting -
so-called "floor resolutions." Unions have sought support for these 
proposals either through the use of the company's proxy materials 
or by conducting an independent solicitation of proxies. Section 
ID.C examines some of the recent campaigns and the legal issues 
that they raise under the federal proxy rules. Finally, section ID.D 
briefly discusses recent "Just Vote No" campaigns, in which unions 
and other shareholders selectively have withheld their approval for 
slates from candidates for a company's board of directors in order 
to register their disapproval of certain board actions. 
Floor resolutions and binding bylaw amendments have the po­
tential to bring about mandatory corporate action and inject unions 
directly into the boardroom. By contrast, traditional corporate­
govemance proposals and "Just Vote No" campaigns rely on indi­
rect pressure on corporate boards to further union-shareholder 
objectives. A union's choice among these tactics will depend on 
what it perceives it needs to do to get a board's attention. 
A. Union Use of the Shareholder Proposal Rule - Rule 14a-8 
Shareholders of public companies have the ability, subject to 
certain limitations and restrictions, to put proposals on the com­
pany's ballot at its annual meeting through the use of SEC Rule 
14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule.96 If a security holder of a cor­
poration notifies the company of its intention to present a proposal 
for action at a forthcoming shareholders' meeting, the company 
must include the proposal in its own proxy material and provide a 
means by which the security holders can vote with respect to the 
proposal. The issuer can exclude a proposal, however, if the propo­
nent fails to meet certain procedural eligibility requirements97 or 
substantive content restrictions.98 
Until recently, shareholders did not use Rule 14a-8 to attempt 
to influence the management of public companies. During the first 
96. See General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8 (1997). For a more complete description of Rule 14a-8, see THOMAS & DIXON, 
supra note 3, § 16. 
97. Rule 14a-8(a) establishes four threshold eligibility requirements: (1) ownership of 
shares; (2) notice and attendance at meeting; (3) timeliness; and (4) number of proposals. 
See 11 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a). These are discussed in more detail in Thomas & Martin, supra 
note 6 (manuscript at 19 n.34). 
98. Rule 14a-8(c)(l)-(13) set forth 13 circumstances under which companies may omit 
proposals from their proxy materials. See 17 C.F .R. § 240.14a-8(c). 1\vo of these provisions, 
14a-8(c)(4) and 14a-8(c)(7), are discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 132-52. 
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thirty years of its existence, the rule was used primarily by small, 
individual shareholders to obtain a forum for expression of opin­
ions that attracted little support from the rest of the shareholder 
body. These activists invoked the rule to obtain a forum for chal­
lenging management's conduct of internal corporate govemance.99 
Pioneering "gadflies," such as Lewis Gilbert, offered resolutions on 
such financial or operational matters as dividend policy, selection of 
auditors, and officer and director compensation, as well as broader 
governance issues such as the location of the annual meeting, cumu­
lative voting, and director qualifications.100 
Beginning with Ralph Nader's legendary "Campaign GM" in 
the early 1970s, however, the focus of shareholder activism shifted 
to the role and responsibilities of the corporation in modem soci­
ety.101 Social-responsibility proposals, attacking a variety of per­
ceived corporate evils, became increasingly numerous in the 1970s 
and 1980s, although they rarely received substantial support. 
By the 1980s, investors began using the shareholder proposal 
process as a means of challenging corporate antitakeover initia­
tives.102 In the 1990s, this trend has continued and was reinforced 
by the 1992 amendments to the federal proxy rules that gave share­
holders enhanced latitude to communicate amongst themselves.103 
Institutions have successfully employed Rule 14a-8 to persuade 
companies to effect changes in board structure and function, execu-
99. See Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate 
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv. 97, 116-17 (1988); see also Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to 
Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REv. 425, 428-30 (1984) (discussing the 
early usage of the shareholder proposal rule). 
100. See Jill E. FISch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 
V AND. L. REv. 1129, 1146 (1993); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A 
Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REv. 879, 879-80 (1994); Ryan, supra note 
99, at 116-17; see also Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal 
Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 807, 813-30 (1952) (discussing a study of 
proxy solicitations from 1948-1951, in which the authors found that shareholder proposals 
generally addressed cumulative voting, auditor selection, annual meeting location, and post­
meeting reports). 
101. See Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Cam­
paign GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1971); Donald E. Schwartz & Elliot J. Weiss, An Assess­
ment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEo. LJ. 635 (1977); see also Medical 
Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (construing the 
ordinary business exclusion to permit shareholders to make a proposal that would alter the 
nature of the company's business, and ordering Dow Chemical Company to include in its 
proxy materials a shareholder proposal seeking to stop the company's continued production 
of napalm despite the SEC's earlier issuance of a no-action letter), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 
403 (1972). 
102. See Palmiter, supra note 100, at 883-84; Ryan, supra note 99, at 157-59. 
103. For an extensive discussion of the 1992 proxy rule amendments, see THOMAS & 
DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.0l(F). 
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tive and director compensation, and other governance-related 
matters. 
Labor unions began using Rule 14a-8 heavily in the 1990s to 
make corporate-governance proposals.104 In the 1994 proxy season, 
labor interests collectively used Rule 14a-8 to file a larger number 
of corporate-governance proposals (eighty) and won more majority 
votes (seven) on these proposals than any other investor group.105 
For the 1995 proxy season, labor organizations filed almost as many 
proposals as the year before.106 A group of fourteen unions, union 
pension funds, individual union memb�rs and a labor-oriented in­
vestment fund filed seventy-five out of the 265 shareholder propos­
als on corporate-governance issues that were tracked by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), an independent 
shareholder organization.107 Labor organizations have continued 
to be very active in submitting shareholder proposals, although the 
number of proposals submitted in 1996 was slightly below their 
peak participation levels in 1994.108 Tables 1 and 2 summarize data 
on union shareholder proposals in 1996 and 1997, respectively. 
The amazing thing about these union-sponsored shareholder 
proposals is how ordinary they are, from the perspective of any in­
stitutional investor. They involve standard corporate-governance 
issues designed to maximize the value of the corporation by im­
proving the efficiency of the market for corporate control and align­
ing manager incentives with shareholder interests. The most 
frequent proposals in the 1995 and 1996 proxy seasons were those 
to redeem or vote on poison pills and to repeal classified boards. 
Of the fifty-four labor-submitted proposals identified by IRRC for 
104. For an in-depth discussion of the development of union-shareholder activism, see 
Thomas & Martin, supra note 6 (manuscript at 10-18). 
105. See Patrick S. McGum, Labor, IRAA Spark Active 1995 Shareholder Campaign, 
CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 1, 3 [hereinafter McGum, Shareholder Cam­
paign]; see also Bernstein, supra note 2, at 79 (observing that unions accounted for 70 proxy 
battles and 7 of the 11 victories registered by shareholders during 1994); Patrick S. McGum, 
Controversy Swirls Around Labor Unions' Shareholder Activism, CoRP. GOVERNANCE 
BULL., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 3 [hereinafter McGum, Controversy] (discussing proposals filed 
before actual votes taken). Several labor proposals to redeem a company's poison pill re­
ceived more than 50% of the votes counted. See id. 
106. See McGum, Shareholder Campaign, supra note 105, at 1. 
107. See Checklist of 1995 Shareholder Proposals, CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., Apr.-June 
1995, at 21-31. 
108. Labor groups include unions, union pension funds, and labor-oriented investment 
funds - for example, Amalgamated Bank of New York LongView Collective Investment 
Fund. For further discussion of labor activism in the 1994 proxy season, see Thomas & 
Martin, supra note 6. See also infra app. tbls.1&2. 
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the 1997 proxy season, ten relate to poison pills and fourteen deal 
with declassifying the board.109 
Labor organizations submitted a wide variety of other corpo­
rate-governance proposals in the 1997 proxy season. Proposals on 
board-related issues include adding an employee to the board,11° 
limiting relatives on the board,111 and prohibiting director conflicts 
of interest.112 Proposals for cumulative voting and for confidential 
voting are still being submitted, but in smaller numbers.113 Execu­
tive pay and performance proposals seem to be appearing more fre­
quently in 1997 than in years past.114 
Companies are apparently being more accommodating to 
union-shareholder proposals in the last couple of years. The 1996 
proxy season saw a decline in the number of no-action requests by 
companies.115 IRRC reports indicate that thirteen companies re­
quested no-action letters for fourteen labor-submitted proposals.116 
Five of these were granted, primarily on the basis of the proposals 
being rendered moot under Rule 14a-8(c)(10).117 Similar IRRC 
data for January 1997 show thirteen companies challenging fifteen 
proposals.118 So far, the SEC has not concurred with companies' 
arguments that it should exclude proposals on the ground that they 
109. See Checklist of 1997 Shareholder Proposals, CoRP. GOVERNANCE Buu •. , Oct. 1996· 
Jan. 1997, at 25-32. 
110. See id. at 25. 
111. See id. at 31. 
112. See, e.g., Robert W. Newbury, Individuals Again Lead Pack on Shareholder Resolu­
tions, CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., Oct. 1996-Jan. 1997, at 6 (observing that the Operating 
Engineers submitted a proposal in 1996, and again in 1997, to prohibit directors from receiv­
ing consulting fees while sitting on the board of WMX Technologies). 
113. For example, there were nine proposals regarding confidential voting by June 1995, 
three such proposals by June 1996, and only one proposal by January 1997. See sources cited 
infra note 114. 
114. Issues appearing with greater frequency include separating the chair and CEO posi· 
tion (one in 1995 and four by early 1997) and imposing various limitations on executive pay 
- for example, limiting deferred compensation, linking pay to overseas labor standards, lim· 
iting CEO pay increases to the percentage granted workers, and limiting the ability of a CEO 
to cash in options within six months of a major layoff. See Checklist of 1997 Shareholder 
Proposals, supra note 109, at 25-32; Checklist of 1996 Shareholder Proposals, CoRP. GOVERN· 
ANCE Buu.., Apr.-June 1996, at 19-31; Checklist of 1995 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 
107, at 21-31. Proposals to restrict nonemployee director pensions are still popular, but their 
numbers are declining due to voluntary corporate action. See Eliminate Director Pensions, 
CoRP. GOVERNANCE Buu .. , Oct. 1996-Jan. 1997, at 3. 
115. There were 352 no-action requests by April 4, 1996, six percent fewer than at the 
same time the previous year. See Vmeeta Anand, Companies Opt for Peace: Shareholder 
Fighting Subdued in 1996 Meeting Season, PENSIONS & lNvEsrMENTS, Apr. 15, 1996, at 19. 
116. See Checklist of 1996 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 114. 
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(10) (1996). 
118. See Checklist of 1997 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 109. 
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are aimed at remedying personal grievances.119 Such proposals 
would be excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(4).120 
1. Procedural Objections to Labor's Shareholder Proposals: 
Rule 14a-8(a) (4) and the Alter Ego Problem 
Rule 14a-8 has a number of procedural requirements that share­
holders must satisfy. The one that has been applied most recently 
to labor unions is Rule 14a-8(a)(4), which limits labor and other 
shareholders to submitting "no more than one proposal and an ac­
companying supporting statement for inclusion in the registrant's 
proxy materials . . . . "121 Shareholders may not submit alternative 
proposals for inclusion in the event their initial proposal is not 
included.122 
This rule becomes an issue when a union or other shareholder 
attempts to avoid the one-proposal limitation by having persons 
they control submit additional proposals.123 Companies often have 
objected to proposals submitted by multiple employee-shareholders 
on the ground that all of the proponents are acting on behalf of a 
union and hence should be restricted to submission of one collec­
tive proposal. 
When faced with this issue, the SEC has stated that if one em­
ployee proponent is the "alter ego" of another proponent, or con­
trols another proponent, it will require them to choose just one 
proposal to submit to the company.124 In some situations, the 
119. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 274, 
at *1 (Feb. 10, 1997); Frontier Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 139, 
at *1 (Jan. 23, 1997). 
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4). 
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(4). 
122. See Southeast Banking Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
1885, at *1-*2 (Feb. 8, 1982). 
123. See Pacific Enters., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 194, at *1-*2 
(Feb. 12, 1996). 
124. See Pacific Enters., 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 194, at *2; Consolidated Freightways, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 256, at *2 (Feb. 23, 1994); Consoli­
dated Freightways, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 213, at *2 (Feb. 9, 
1994); Jefferson-Pilot Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 353, at *1-*2 
(Mar. 12, 1992). As Linda Quinn and Andrea Menaker note: 
Companies have sought to exclude proposals sponsored by unions or union members on 
two grounds: one procedural, the other substantive. Procedurally, the company may 
contend that such proposals are submitted on behalf of the union, and that these union 
members are simply "nominal" proponents. Thus, the company may argue that the pro­
posals should be excluded as exceeding the one proposal per proponent limit of Rule 
14a-8(a)(4). 
Linda C. Quinn & Andrea J. Menaker, The Shareholder Proposal Process, in A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 16-9 (A. Goodman & J. Olson eds., 2d 
ed. 1992 & Supp. 1997). Quinn and Menaker further cite Rule 14a-8(c)(4), the "personal 
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union's actions are sufficient to indicate that it controls the other 
proponents, typically union members. For example, the SEC 
granted no-action relief to one company where the union initially 
submitted six shareholder proposals under its own name, then, 
upon learning of the one-proposal limitation, resubmitted the pro­
posals separately in its own name and that of several union 
members.125 
In most situations, however, it will be very difficult for a com­
pany to succeed in obtaining relief under the alter-ego theory. 
Generally speaking, a showing that the proponent's union prepared 
the Rule 14a-8 proposal and supporting statement will not by itself 
lead to a grant of no-action relief for the company.126 Furthermore, 
the SEC has determined that a union's provision of legal and cleri­
cal assistance to its members who are submitting shareholder pro­
posals is not enough by itself to demonstrate that such members are 
merely nominal proponents acting for a union.127 During the 1996 
proxy season, the SEC began issuing a new response to companies' 
requests to exclude proposals on this basis, "indicating that based 
on the facts provided by both sides, the staff was unable to conclude 
whether or not the proponent was acting on behalf of another per­
son. "128 This places a heavy burden on companies seeking to ex­
clude proposals on this ground.129 The SEC now appears to require 
clear evidence of abuse of the proposal process before permitting 
the company to exclude the proposal.130 
Only one company seeking to exclude a union members' pro­
posals met the SEC's burden during the 1996 season.131 A review 
grievance" exclusion, as the second, substantive reason for claiming these proposals should 
be excluded. See id. 
125. See Pacific Enters., 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 194. 
126. See Quinn & Menaker, supra note 124, at 16-10 n.26. 
127. See id. 
128. Id. at 16-10 (citing Consolidated Freightways, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC 
No-Act LEXIS 158 (Feb. 1, 1996), and Panhandle E. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 
SEC No-Act LEXIS 8 (Jan. 3, 1996)). According to Quinn & Menaker, the SEC staff "[i]n 
so responding . . .  [has] made it clear that in not issuing a no-action letter it was not rejecting 
the company's position, but rather taking no position at all on the merits of the [(a)(4)] 
argument." Id. 
129. The "change" in the SEC's position on this issue has been attributed to union lobby­
ing of SEC Chair Arthur Levitt and then-Corporation Finance Division director Linda 
Quinn. See Robert S. Reder & Philip Berkowitz, Recent Developments in Proxy Contests, in 
DOING DEALS 1996, at 575, 644 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-930, 
1996). 
130. See id. at 645. 
131. See Abigail Arms, Current Issues and Rulemaking Projects: Division of Corporation 
Finance-Securities and Exchange Commission, in NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 
1996, at 179 (PLI Comm. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. A-513, 1996). The com· 
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of the no-action letters available on LEXIS found only one com­
pany during the 1997 season challenging a shareholder proposal on 
the ground that the proposal was submitted by the alter ego of a 
union.132 
2. Substantive Objections to Labor's Shareholder Proposals 
Some corporations have resisted labor's efforts to use the share­
holder-proposal rule by seeking to exclude labor proposals under 
the substantive provisions of Rule 14a-8(c).133 Companies faced 
with labor-shareholder proposals usually argue for exclusion on the 
ground that the proposal either (1) relates to the redress of a per­
sonal claim or grievance against the company or is designed to fur­
ther a personal interest of the proponent which is not shared with 
the other security holders at large - the "personal grievance" ex­
clusion in 14a-8(c)(4),134 or (2) deals with a matter relating to the 
conduct of the ordinary business operations of the company - the 
"ordinary business" exclusion in 14a-8(c)(7).135 Unions increas­
ingly are able to thwart these substantive objections, in large part 
because their proposals look like the proposals of other large, insti­
tutional investors. 
a. Rule 14a-8(c) (4): "Personal Grievance" Exclusion. Manage­
ment frequently tries to exclude labor proposals under Rule 14a-
8( c )( 4), the "personal grievance" exemption.136 The SEC adopted 
this exemption to prevent a shareholder from harassing an issuer 
into giving the proponent some particular benefit not shared by 
other shareholders, or to accomplish objectives particular to the 
proponent and not to other shareholders.137 The basis for this ex­
clusion is an administrative concern that "the costs of vindicating an 
pany was Pacific Enterprises, which received two proposals from the Utility Workers. See 
Pacific Enters., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 194, at *l (Feb. 12, 1996). 
132. See Frontier Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 155, at *3 
(Jan. 23, 1997). Frontier challenged a proposal submitted by R. Flavin, the president of the 
CWA local that had also submitted a proposal to the company. Mr. Flavin withdrew his 
proposal before the SEC acted on Frontier's request. See Frontier Corp., 1997 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 155, at *l. 
133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1996). 
134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4). 
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7). We should also mention that there are other grounds on 
which the company can seek no-action relief from the SEC. For further discussion of these 
exclusions, see THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04. 
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-8(c)(4). For further discussion of the history of § (c)(4) and its 
interpretation, see THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04(D). 
137. See TuoMAs & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04(D). 
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individual shareholder's personal interests should not be shifted to 
the issuer and hence indirectly to all other shareholders. "138 
The SEC has not uniformly handled company challenges to 
labor-shareholder proposals under 14a-8(c)(4).139 The SEC's pres­
ent position with regard to labor-shareholder proposals is that em­
ployees have the same rights as other shareholders to offer these 
proposals. Proposals may not be excluded based only on the con­
tention that the proponent is acting in the interests of union mem­
bers. To exclude a labor-shareholder proposal, the company must 
present concrete, noncircumstantial evidence that the proposal is 
merely another tactic in the union's corporate campaign.140 The 
burden is on the company to show that the proposal qualifies for 
exclusion.141 In recent no-action letters, the SEC has tended to per­
mit labor-shareholder proposals that relate to facially neutral cor­
porate-governance issues.142 
b. Rule 14a-8(c) (7): "Ordinary Business" Exclusion. Corpora­
tions frequently try to exclude labor-shareholder proposals on the 
ground that they relate to the ordinary business of the company 
under Rule 14a-8(c)(7). This "ordinary business" provision permits 
a co�pany to exclude social- and public-policy proposals that relate 
to the day-to-day business affairs of the corporation.143 
The SEC's interpretation of this provision has shifted over the 
years.144 For many years prior to 1992, the SEC interpreted the 
rule to mean that shareholder proposals involving substantial policy 
considerations could not be omitted from proxy materials pursuant 
to the ordinary-business exception, even if they raised issues other-
138. Id. 
139. See Vmeeta Anand, Employee-Shareholders: An Angry New Voice, PENSIONS & IN· 
VESTMENTS, Apr. 4, 1994, at 26; Patrick S. McGum, SEC Holds Key to Labor Shareholder 
Proposals, CoRP. GOVERNANCE Buu., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 9; Leslie Scism, Labor Unions In­
creasingly Initiate Proxy Proposals, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1994, at Cl. 
140. See 4 Loms Loss & JoEL SEUGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2020 (3d ed. 1990); 
McGum, supra note 139, at 10 (quoting William E. Morley, senior associate director, Divi­
sion of Corporate Fmance, SEC). 
141. See Beth Duncan, SEC Streamlining Its Handling of No-Action Letters, Quinn Says, 
BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, June 15, 1995, at A12, Al3 (reporting the remarks of 
Linda C. Qninn, Director, Division of Corporation Fmance, SEC, at the 7th Annual General 
Counsel Conference, June 13, 1995). 
142. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04(D), for further discussion of these is­
sues. Cf. Thomas & Martin, supra note 6. 
143. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c}(7). The rationale for the exclusion is that manage­
ment's exercise of its specialized talents should be protected from investors attempting to 
dictate the minutiae of daily business decisions. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, 
§ 16.04(G). 
144. See TuoMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04(G), for a further discussion of the his­
tory of this provision. 
February 1998] Union-Shareholder Activism 1051 
wise relating to the ordinary business of the corporation.145 In 
1992, the SEC reversed this interpretation in a no-action letter to 
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., advising the company that 
it could omit a proposal addressing discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation under (c)(7), even though the proposal raised 
social-policy concems.146 The shareholder-proponent of the propo­
sal challenged this change in federal court and won in the district 
court, only to be reversed on appeal by the Second Circuit.14' 
After the Second Circuit's decision, the SEC resumed148 issuing 
no-action letters to companies stating that shareholder proposals 
that relate to the corporation's ordinary business but which also 
raise substantial social-policy considerations can be omitted from 
proxy materials pursuant to the "ordinary business" exception.149 
Thus, employment-related shareholder proposals may be omitted 
from proxy statements if they deal with ordinary business issues, 
even when they also raise important social-policy concems.150 
So far in the 1997 season, only two companies appear to have 
raised the "ordinary business" exemption in seeking to exclude 
labor-union proposals: Philip Morris's challenge to the Teamsters' 
proposal for an independent compensation committee on (c)(7) 
grounds was denied,151 while Lockheed Martin's request to omit a 
union proposal on those grounds was allowed.152 
145. See id. 
146. See Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 
289095, at *1-*3 (Oct. 13, 1992). 
147. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994), revd., 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995). 
148. After refusing to consider Rule 14a-8(c)(7) challenges during the pendency of litiga­
tion, the SEC began issuing no-action letters in May 1995, when it concurred with BE Aero­
space's argument that NYCERS' proposal to implement or increase activity on the McBride 
principles could be excluded. See BE Aerospace, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No­
Act. LEXIS 527, at *1 (May 31, 1995). The McBride principles ask that employers doing 
business in Northern Ireland promote equal employment opportunities for Catholics and 
Protestants in Northern Ireland and prohibit sexual harassment. See Dorning, supra note 27; 
Andrew J. Hoffman, A Strategic Response to Investor Activism, 37 SLOAN MGMr. REv. 51, 53 
(1996). 
149. See Duncan, supra note 141, at A12. 
150. See Ken Bertsch, Court Reverses Cracker Barrel Decision; Equal Employment Reso­
lutions in Doubt, NEws FOR lNvEsToRS, Jan. 1995, at 1. As of this writing, the SEC is review­
ing its policies on this question, and it appears likely that it will reverse its position once 
again. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 
IC-22,828, 1997 WL 578696 at *12 (Sept. 18, 1997) [hereinafter SEC Proposals]. 
151. See Philip Morris Cos., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act LEXIS 218, 
at *1 (Jan. 30, 1997). 
152. The CWAIITU Negotiated Pension Plan's proposal would have mandated that "the 
board of directors . . .  evaluate whether the company has a legal compliance program that 
adequately reviews conflicts of interest and the hiring of former government officials and 
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3. Empirical Studies of Unions' and Other Shareholders' 
Corporate-Governance Proposals 
A variety of empirical studies have focused on the utility of 
shareholder proposals, looking at whether other shareholders sup­
port them and whether they lead to measurable improvements in 
corporate performance. Only one study, however, ha$ focused spe­
cifically on labor-sponsored shareholder proposals, so we begin 
with a discussion of it. 
a. Shareholder Support for Labor's Shareholder Voting Initia­
tives. Using data from the 1994 proxy season, Thomas and Martin 
examined how voting support differs for corporate-governance pro­
posals sponsored by labor as compared with other shareholder 
groups.153 After controlling for the type of shareholder proposal 
and the company's ownership structure, they found that: "(1) 
labor-sponsored proposals received a statistically significantly 
higher percentage of favorable votes than did similar proposals 
sponsored by private institutions and individuals; and (2) labor­
sponsored proposals obtained approximately the same percentage 
of votes as proposals sponsored by public institutions."154 These 
findings support the conclusion that shareholders view labor-share­
holder corporate-governance proposals no differently than they 
view similar proposals submitted by other groups of shareholders. 
These conclusions are subject to the challenge that labor pro­
posals arise in two contexts: general corporate-governance propos­
als for which all shareholders share the same interest in improving 
corporate-governance structures, and situations in which labor has 
a conflict of interest with other shareholders because it is trying to 
further its interests as workers. To explore these issues, Thomas 
and Martin focused on a subsample of proposals identified by a 
management-oriented group as specific instances in which labor 
used the shareholder-proposal mechanism as part of a corporate 
campaign.155 While these labor proposals received a slightly lower 
percentage of favorable votes than other similar proposals, the dif­
ferences were not statistically significant.156 This suggests that, 
even in situations in which labor is battling management over other 
issues, such as collective-bargaining negotiations, shareholders con-
employees and . . .  prepare a report on its findings." Lockheed Martin, SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 208, at *1 (Jan. 29, 1997). 
153. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 6. 
154. Id. (manuscript at 7-8). 
155. See id. (manuscript at 8). 
156. See id. 
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tinue to treat labor corporate-governance proposals no differently 
than those submitted by other shareholder groups. 
b. The Financial Impact of Shareholder Proposals. A variety of 
studies have attempted to measure the impact of shareholder cor­
porate-governance proposals on firm value. Two studies have 
found little evidence that these proposals have any effect on target­
firm performance. Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling studied 866 
shareholder corporate-governance proposals at 317 publicly traded 
companies between March 1986 and October 1990.157 They found 
that, while these proposals were targeted at poorly performing com­
panies, they had little impact on firm policies or firm value.15s 
In another study of the impact of shareholder corporate-govern­
ance proposals, Wahal looked at firms targeted by nine major insti­
tutional investors between 1987 and 1993.159 Wahal found that, 
although the funds were relatively successful in getting companies 
to adopt these corporate-governance reforms, the changes did not 
result in · significant improvements in the companies' 
performances.160 
These studies may not adequately measure the impact of union­
shareholder proposals for two reasons. First, they do not control 
for the sponsor of the proposals. Thus, they cannot examine the 
difference between proposals by labor unions and other sponsors. 
Second, these studies use data for periods prior to the rise of union­
shareholder activism. Thus, they tell us little about the financial 
effects of union-sponsored proposals. Further research is needed to 
determine if these general results apply to the union-sponsored pro­
posals of recent years.161 
Studies by Strickland, Wtles, and Zenner,162 Opler and 
Sokobin,163 and Bizak and Marquette,164 by contrast, have found 
157. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: 
Empirical Evidence (May 8, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
158. See id. at 30-31. 
159. See Sunil Wahal, Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, 31 J. FIN. & QUAN­
TITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1996). The nine funds include public pension funds from the states of 
California, Colorado, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wrsconsin, and CREF. 
160. See id. at 3. 
161. Martin and Thomas are currently in the process of examining the impact of labor 
unions' and other sponsor groups' shareholder proposals on various measures of economic 
performance. 
162. See Dean Strickland et al., A Requiem for the USA: Is Small Shareholder Monitor­
ing Effective?, 40 J. FIN. EcoN. 319 (1996). 
163. See Tun Opler & Jonathan Sokobin, Does Coordinated Institutional Activism Work? 
An Analysis of the Activities of the Council of Institutional Investors (visited July 17, 1997) 
<http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/-fin/faculty/opler/ciiabs.htin>. 
164. See Bizjak & Marquette, supra note 68. 
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positive effects on firm value from institutional-shareholder activ­
ism. Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner examined efforts of the United 
Shareholders Association (USA) to monitor management perform­
ance during its existence from 1986-1993. They found that the USA 
proposals to alter corporate-governance ·structures and settlements 
of these proposals resulted in positive abnormal stock price returns 
of roughly 0.9% during a two-day event window, or approximately 
$39 million per firm, for a total of $1.3 billion for all firms in the 
sample.165 They found no increases · in firm value relating to pro­
posals concerning poison pills or golden parachutes.166 
Opler and Sokobin tracked the performance of firms identified 
by the Council of Institutional Investors as poor performers during 
1991-1993. They found that in the sample years following their ap­
pearance on the CIT list, these firms outperformed the S&P 500 by 
an average of eight percent.167 They argue that this improved per­
formance was the result of the institutional investors' monitoring 
efforts in a coordinated and quiet strategy to improve corporate 
governance at these firms. 
Fmally, Bizjak and Marquette examined 193 firms in which 
shareholders submitted proposals to rescind the company's poison 
pill antitakeover defenses between 1987 and 1993. They found evi­
dence that poison pills were more likely to be restructured when 
there was a shareholder resolution and that these restructurings 
were associated with increases in shareholder value.168 They also 
examined whether the identity of the sponsor of the proposal af­
fected the likelihood of a pill restructuring and found that pension 
fund proposals had the greatest likelihood of success.169 Bizjak and 
Marquette concluded that their results supported claims that share­
holder resolutions to rescind poison pills have some effect on man­
agers' actions and that shareholders monitor managerial behavior. 
165. See Strickland et al., supra note 162, at 321. 
166. See id. at 333-35. They did find that other potential benefits included more monitor­
ing effort by outside directors, increased SEC regulation of executive compensation disclo­
sures, increased activism by other shareholders, especially public pension funds, and 
competitive pressure on other firms in the industry. See id. at 336-37. 
167. See Opler & Sokobin, supra note 163, at 7. 
168. See Bizjak & Marquette, supra note 68 (manuscript at 3). 
169. Unions sponsored 16 of the shareholder resolutions in their sample. See id. (manu­
script at 5). Union sponsorship is a positive and significant explanatory variable for pill reso­
lutions that receive more than half of the votes cast at the annual shareholder meeting, but 
not in their other equations. See id. tbls.4-7. Compare id. app. tbl.5 with id. app. tbl.4. 
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While it is difficult to generalize froin these studies and related 
studies,170 we believe that they demonstrate two broad trends. 
First, changes in corporate-governance structures alone do not re­
sult in increases in firm value. If these changes are coupled with 
improved shareholder monitoring and related effects, however, 
they can lead to small but significant increases in value for all share­
holders. If this is correct, it means that union-shareholder activists 
must couple their voting initiatives with continued monitoring ef­
forts in order to bring about increases in firm value. We discuss 
these issues more in Parts IV and V below. 
B. Mandatory Bylaw Amendment Shareholder Proposals Under 
Rule l 4a-8 and the Fleming Companies Decision 
Labor unions have recently begun using Rule 14a-8 to present 
proposals for changes to a company's bylaws for a binding share­
holder vote.171 State corporate law generally grants shareholders 
the unilateral right to amend corporate bylaws.172 The grant of sim­
ilar powers to the board of directors in a company's articles of in­
corporation or bylaws usually does not divest this right,173 although 
a charter provision may explicitly deny shareholders the power to 
initiate a bylaw amendment.174 
State law usually has not imposed express limits on the sub­
stance of corporate bylaws or shareholder-initiated amendments to 
the bylaws. Thus, shareholders arguably may address through by-
170. See, e.g., Teresa Ghilarducci et al., Labour's Paradoxical Interests and the Evolution 
of Corporate Governance {1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); see also 
Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: 
Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 898 {1996). See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER & 
ROBERT W. VrsHNY, A SURVEY OF CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE {National Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 5554, 1996). 
171. Rule 14a-8 generally permits shareholders to submit binding resolutions on matters 
that state law commits to the shareholder body. See TuoMAs & DIXON, supra note 3, 
§ 16.04{A), for a further discussion of the issues discussed in this section. In other situations, 
the Commission staff has required that a mandatory proposal for action that would run afoul 
of (c){l) be recast as precatory in order to be included on the proxy statement. See id. 
172. See Bevis Longstreth & Nancy Kane, Shareholders' Growing Role in Executive Com­
pensation (pt. 2), N.Y. LJ., Feb. 27, 1992, at 5; see also DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 {1991); 
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 601 (McKinney 1986); MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 10.20 {1996). See 
generally THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16.04{A). 
173. See R. Franklin Balotti & Daniel A. Dreisbach, The Permissible Scope of Share­
holder Bylaw Amendments in Delaware, 1 CoRP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Oct.-Nov. 1992, at 
19, 19; Kenneth J. Bialkin & Richard J. Grossman, The Permissible Scope of Shareholder 
Bylaw Amendments in New York, 1 CoRP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Oct.-Nov. 1992, at 25, 25; 
see also DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 109{a) {1991); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 60l(a) (McKinney 
1986). 
174. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 109{a) {1991); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 60l{a) (McKin­
ney 1986). 
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law amendments any aspect of the business or affairs of the corpo­
ration or the respective rights and powers of the board and 
shareholders that is not barred explicitly by state law or the corpo­
ration's certificate of incorporation.175 At some point, however, 
this broad shareholder power to adopt or amend corporate bylaws 
must yield to the board's authority to manage the business and af­
fairs of the corporation.176 The problem becomes one of drawing 
the exact line between the respective authorities of directors and 
shareholders under the relevant state law. 
A federal district court in Oklahoma addressed these issues in 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v. Fleming 
Companies, Inc.177 The case developed out of a Teamsters' share­
holder proposal at Fleming Companies for the 1997 annual meeting 
to amend the company's bylaws to redeem the current poison pill; 
require that the board of directors submit to shareholders its plan 
for any future poison pill; and prohibit the board from adopting the 
plan unless a majority of shareholders approved it.178 Fleming re­
sponded by filing a declaratory action in state court seeking a ruling 
that the proposal violated Oklahoma state law.179 The Teamsters in 
turn filed a federal suit alleging a violation of Rule 14a-8 and seek-
175. See Longstreth & Kane, supra note 172, at 5; see also DBI .. CooE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 109(b) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 601(c) (McKinney 1986). According to Longstreth 
and Kane, 
[i]t is highly doubtful, as a matter of statutory construction, that shareholders, who are 
expressly given the right to adopt or amend by-laws, which . . .  may contain provisions 
relating to the business and affairs of the corporation and the relative rights and powers 
of directors and shareholders, are nonetheless preempted from exercising this right in 
connection with any subject matter that directors have authority to address under their 
power to manage. 
Longstreth & Kane, supra note 172, at 5. 
176. See Bialkin & Grossman, supra note 173, at 26-27 (observing that precisely where 
that point of irreconcilable conflict is reached under New York law is unclear, but concluding 
that shareholders likely would be barred from adopting bylaw amendments that unduly re­
stricted the board's ability to determine corporate-governance and executive-compensation 
matters); see also Balotti & Dreisbach, supra note 173, at 21. 
177. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., No. CIV-96-1650-A, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2980 (W D. Okla. Jan. 24, 1997) (granting plaintiff's motion for sum­
mary judgment requiring the company to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materi­
als); International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., No. CIV-96-1650-A, 1997 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2979 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 19, 1997) (denying defendant's motion to suspend 
injunction pending appeal). For further analysis of this decision, see John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Bylaw Barricades: Union and Shareholder Rights, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 27, 1997, at 5. 
178. See Fleming Cos., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 885, at *3 (Dec. 
3, 1996). The proposal was made after the Teamsters' General Fund submitted a proposal 
requesting that the company redeem its poison pill during the 1996 proxy season, which re­
ceived 64% of the shareholder vote. See 1996 SEC No-Act. 885, at *14. The Fleming board 
responded to the vote by voting to renew the poison pill until 2006. 
179. See Fleming Cos. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund, No. CJ-96-6110 
(Okla. Dist. Ct. Sept. 6, 1996). 
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ing declaratory and injunctive relief ordering the company to in­
clude the resolution in its proxy materials and proxy cards for the 
1997 annual shareholders' meeting.180 
In both cases, the courts were asked to determine whether 
shareholders could amend the bylaws so as to limit the board of 
directors' statutory decisionmaking authority. Oklahoma law pro­
vides that every domestic corporation "may create and issue . . . 
rights or options entitling the holders thereof to purchase from the 
corporation any shares of its capital stock," subject to any provi­
sions in the certificate of incorporation.181 Under this provision, 
the board claimed to have the power, subject to the certificate of 
incorporation - which was silent on the matter - to implement a 
shareholder rights plan, as such plans involve the creation of rights 
to purchase the company's securities under specified 
circumstances.182 
The Teamsters argued that the board�s power to implement a 
rights plan could be curtailed by shareholder action, pointing out 
that Oklahoma law gives shareholders the ultimate power to amend 
the corporate bylaws, which can be neither divested nor limited by 
the board,183 and that it further provides that "the bylaws may con­
tain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate 
of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the 
conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or 
powers of its shareholders, directors, officers or employees. "184 
Fleming Companies responded that the Teamsters' proposal, be-
180. See Fleming Cos., 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 885, at *9-*10.' 
181. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1038 (1991). 
182. See Fleming Cos., 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 885, at *10-*11. Tue SEC declined to 
issue a determination or comment on the company's arguments due to the pending litigation. 
See 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 885, at *1. 
183. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1013(A) (1991) provides: 
Tue original or other bylaws of a corporation may be adopted, amended or repealed by 
the incorporators, by the initial directors if they were named in the certificate of incorpo­
ration, or, before a corporation has received any payment for any of its stock, by its 
board of directors. After a corporation has received any payment for any of its stock, 
the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the shareholders entitled to vote, 
or, in the case of a nonstock corporation, in its members entitled to vote; provided, 
however, any corporation, in its certificate of incorporation, may confer the power to 
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors or, in the case of a nonstock corpora­
tion, upon its governing body by whatever name designated. Tue fact that such power 
has been so conferred upon the directors or governing body, as the case may be, shall 
not divest the shareholders or members of the power, nor limit their power to adopt, 
amend or repeal bylaws. 
184. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1013(B). 
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cause it would limit the directors' statutory power, violated 
Oklahoma law.185 
The federal district court ruled in favor of the Teamsters.186 It 
found that the directors had the power to adopt any rights plan they 
desired under Oklahoma law, subject to the subsequent approval of 
the shareholders.187 Fleming Companies has appealed the district 
court's decision,188 although the company's directors terminated the 
current poison pill plan, effective April 30, 1997.189 
Given the similarity between the Oklahoma and Delaware stat­
utes, the district court's decision could have profound implications 
for labor groups' and other shareholders' ability to force companies 
to change their antitakeover defenses and corporate-governance 
structures. Other shareholders undoubtedly "will offer a lot" of 
these proposals.190 
Boards of directors faced with these types of mandatory bylaw 
amendments, or the threat of such amendments, will need to take 
unions' actions very seriously or risk becoming takeover targets of 
potential acquirors alerted to their vulnerability by a successful 
shareholder vote. Unions that are frustrated with the more passive 
forms of shareholder activism, or with traditional labor organizing 
efforts, now have another avenue for gaining influence with 
companies.191 
185. See Transcript of Oral Arguments on Motions for Summary Judgment at 25, 28, In­
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Co., No. CIV-96-1650-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2980 {W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 1997). The Teamsters responded that Fleming's position 
with regard to § 1038 would render § 1013(B) wholly ineffective, in that it suggests that the 
shareholders also could not adopt bylaws that relate to the business and affairs of the corpo­
ration, something over which Oklahoma law also granted the directors authority. See 'Il'an­
script at 14-15. 
186. See Transcript at 30-32. 
187. See 'Il'anscript at 31. The judge cited two additional considerations that went "be­
yond the face of the statutes": his reservations regarding granting directors, the "constitu­
ency in corporate governance that is most likely to be viewing the situation in light of self­
interest," with exclusive power to make decisions under § 1038, see Transcript at 31, and his 
reservations about putting issues affecting the marketability of shares beyond the cognizance 
of "the people who really care about the marketability of shares," see Transcript at 32. The 
judge also noted that Fleming's decision to ignore the shareholder's "large majority vote" on 
the poison pill exerted "a tug" on his decision. See Transcript at 32. 
188. See Bertsch & McGeary, supra note 35, at 1; see also International Bhd. of Teamsters 
Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., No. CIV-96-1650-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2979 (W.D. Okla. 
Feb. 19, 1997) {denying defendant's motion to suspend injunction pending appeal). 
189. See Fleming Cos., supra note 36. 
190. See Anand, supra note 95, at 20 (quoting Howard Sherman, President of Institu­
tional Shareholder Services, Inc., a well-known shareholder advisory firm). 
191. Several unions have proposed a variety of bylaw amendments at various companies. 
These proposals include the redemption of poison pills, elimination of classified boards, and 
adoption of confidential voting policies. See Coffee, supra note 177, at 127. UNITE has filed 
a federal lawsuit challenging May Department Stores's actions in responding to its 
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C. Shareholder Resolutions at the Annual Meeting and Corporate 
Management's Responses 
Unions that want to get their proposals before the company's 
shareholders have another alternative to the shareholder proposal 
rule - they can present the proposal in their capacity as ·a share­
holder of the company at the annual shareholders' meeting, subject 
to satisfaction of the company's advance notice bylaws, if any exist. 
According to the IRRC, seventeen floor resolutions were intro:. 
duced in this manner during the 1996 proxy season, fourteen by 
labor groups.192 
Labor groups have introduced floor resolutions at annual share­
holders' meetings in an effort to increase pressure on employers 
with whom they have a dispute. For example, in the 1996 proxy 
season, the Teamsters announced such a proposal and indepen­
dently solicited proxies from Gannett shareholders at a time when a 
Teamsters local was engaged in a lengthy strike against Detroit 
Newspaper Agency, a joint operating agency between Gannett's 
Detroit News and Knight-Ridder's Detroit Free Press.193 In a re­
lated matter, the Teamsters conducted an independent proxy solici­
tation in support of its proposal to separate the chair and CEO 
positions at Union Pacific, of which one Gannett director, Drew 
Lewis, is the Chair and CEO. The supplemental material Union 
Pacific submitted to its shareholders, which included a revised 
proxy card, claimed that the Teamsters' action was due in part to its 
attempts to convince nonunion employees at Overnite Transporta­
tion Company, a Union Pacific subsidiary, to join the union.194 
During the 1996 proxy season, the UFCW's Local 99R similarly 
filed proposals at Albertson's and at five other companies identified 
through interlocking directorates.195 It submitted a total of eleven 
proposals regarding confidential voting, votes on future golden 
mandatory bylaw amendment See Complaint, UNITE v. The May Dept. Stores Co., No. 97 
Civ. 2120 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 30, 1997). 
192. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 4. 
193. See Gannett Co., Preliminary Proxy Statement 23 (Mar. 22, 1996), available in 
EDGAR, Film No. 96,537,462. 
194. See Union Pac. Corp., Definitive Additional Materials 1 (Apr. 5, 1996), available in 
EDGAR, Ftlm No. 96,544,406. 
195. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 4. Each of the targeted companies 
has directors who are also directors on Albertson's board. See Albertson's, Inc., Preliminary 
Proxy Statement 6-9 (Mar. 29, 1996), available in EDGAR, Ftlm No. 96,540,623. 
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parachutes, declassifying the board, and redeeming the poison 
pill.196 These proposals are summarized in Table 3.197 
In 1997, the UFCW Local again is targeting Albertson's, in addi­
tion to six companies that share directors with Albertson's.198 Pre­
liminary proxy materials indicate that the UFCW's Phoenix Local is 
engaged in negotiations over a successor contract and is also at­
tempting to unionize other Albertson's employees in Arizona.199 
The company has refused the Local's request to be voluntarily rec­
ognized as the representative of its currently nonunion workers and 
has instead insisted on "NLRB elections, which are slower and 
often more expensive to shareholders (they often result in years of 
litigation)."200 The floor resolutions that the Local intends to intro­
duce regard declassifying the board at Boeing, Boise Cascade, and 
Questar; confidential voting at Albertson's and Heritage Media; 
and redeeming a poison pill at Pier i .201 Table 3 in the appendix 
contains more information on the UFCW's 1997 shareholder 
initiatives.202 
The UFCW appears to have chosen these proposals carefully to 
appeal to most shareholder groups. According to I.R.R.C. data, 
proposals raising these issues received an average of 42.1 % of the 
vote for board declassification resolutions, 31.5% for confidential 
voting resolutions, and 53.4% for poison pill redemption resolu­
tions, of the votes cast by shareholders at other companies in the 
1996 proxy season.203 In particular, I.R.R.C. data show that pro-
196. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 4. 
197. See infra app. tbl.3. 
198. See CoUNCIL OF INSTL. lNvEsroRS LETTER, supra note 26, at 2. 
199. See Albertson's, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Jan. 28, 1997) available in 
EDGAR, Ftlm No. 97,512,181. The UFCW has attempted to organize employees at 28 Al­
bertson's stores in Arizona. See Rani Cher Monson, Unions Fail to Change Albertson's, 
IDAHO STATESMAN, May 25, 1996, at SB. 
200. See Albertson's, Inc., supra note 199. The AFL-CIO now advocates the strategy of 
avoiding an NLRB election and obtaining voluntary recognition from employers once au­
thorization cards have been signed by a majority of employees. See Bernstein, supra note 54, 
at 56. 
201. Information is not yet available on the resolution(s) the UFCW intends to submit to 
TIS Mortgage Investment Company shareholders. See COUNCIL OF lNSTL. INVESTORS 
LETTER, supra note 26, at 3. 
202. See infra app. tbl.3. 
203. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 1-2; Declassify Boards, CoRP. 
GOVERNANCE BULL., Oct 1996-Jan. 1997, at 9 (listing companies expecting shareholder de­
classification proposals). The 1996 Summary listed the percentages as noted above, with one 
exception. It indicated that 42.3% of shareholders supported proposals to declassify the 
board, but also noted that this figure included a proposal supported by management and that 
without that proposal, the figure was lower. The October-January publication states that 
42.l % of shareholders supported board declassification proposals. See Declassify Boards, 
supra, at 9. 
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posals advocating declassifying the board received more support 
than proposals about other board issues. Likewise, confidential 
voting received more support on average than proposals raising any 
other voting issue. Proposals to redeem poison pills received 
greater support on average than proposals concerning any other an­
titakeover issue.204 Thus, the introduction of these particular issues 
appears to reflect an effort to choose those issues that have a 
greater probability of success and that are therefore likely to place 
more pressure on the targeted employer. 
This illustrates the point we raised in Part II: it is no accident 
that unions are on the cutting edge of new voting methods in this 
area. When they have been unsuccessful in getting the results they 
desire using traditional labor tactics or precatory Rule 14a-8 pro­
posals, they have used innovative voting approaches designed to ap­
peal to a broad cross-section of shareholders. 
Labor unions' submission of floor resolutions allows them to by­
pass the restrictions in Rule 14a-8. Thus, a union may inform a 
company of its intention to introduce a resolution at the annual 
meeting without regard to the 120-day deadline in 14a-8(a)(3) and 
may do so without holding the requisite number of shares for the 
one-year period as required in 14a-8(a)(l).205 A union also may 
submit more than the one-proposal maximum in 14a-8(a)(4). Thus, 
floor resolutions can raise multiple issues, seek binding changes to 
corporate structures, and be placed on the ballot with little notice to 
the company. 
To gain support for these proposals, a union may seek to use the 
company's proxy materials to solicit shareholder support, or it may 
launch its own solicitation. It is much cheaper and more effective 
for a union if the company includes the proposal in its proxy materi­
als by making disclosure concerning the proposal and including a 
line on its proxy card for shareholders to vote on the proposal. 
Companies have several options when they know that a union 
will try to place a proposal before the shareholder meeting.206 If 
204. See I.R.R.C., 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 1-2. 
205. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 455, 
at *4 (Apr. 18, 1996) (observing that the UFCW informed the company of its intention to 
submit its resolution days before proxy materials were to be sent to shareholders); Union 
Pac. Corp., supra note 194, at 1 (observing that the Teamsters purchased shares of Union 
Pacific stock "a few days" before notifying the company of its plan to introduce its proposal 
at the annual meeting). 
206. For example, in the 1996 proxy season Albertson's included on its original proxy 
card the UFCW's proposal and provided the company's statement in opposition in its materi­
als. See Albertson's, Inc., supra note 195, at 25-27. Boeing, targeted in the 1997 season, has 
agreed to include UFCW's proposal on its proxy card and has submitted the company's state-
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the company is aware of the proposal sufficiently early, then it may 
choose to include the union's proposal and supporting statement in 
the company's proxy materials, just as it would any shareholder 
proposal. If the company decides to do this, however, "the propo­
sal is likely to get a high vote, comparable to any 'normal' share­
holder proposal. Albertson's and Questar handled union proposals 
this way [in 1996] . . .  and the proposals drew support ranging from 
21 % to 38%."207 
Not surprisingly, some companies have chosen not to take this 
path. If the union is forced to raise the proposal at the meeting 
without any advance notice to the shareholders through the com­
pany materials, then most proxies already will have been voted. A 
proposal presented in this manner will probably not be able to gar­
ner many votes, even if the union is able to do some solicitation 
prior to or at the meeting. Thus, some union proposals that were 
not included in the company's proxy materials and original proxy 
cards drew votes of less than one or two percent.2os 
As discussed more fully below,209 however, if the company is 
informed about the union's proposal in sufficient time prior to the 
meeting to include the proposal in its proxy materials and chooses 
not to include it, then the corporation must inform its shareholders 
that the proposal exists, as well as, if the company intends to use its 
discretionary voting authority to vote on the proposal, how the 
company plans to vote the proxies it receives. If the company fails 
to make this disclosure, then, subject to certain limitations, the SEC 
has opined that the company will be unable to exercise discretion­
ary voting authority to vote the proxies it receives on the propo­
sal.210 In fact, in 1996, some companies decided to revise their 
proxy materials and send out new proxy cards carrying a union's 
proposal after learning that the union shareholder intended to 
make the proposal at the annual meeting.211 
ment in its proxy materials. See Boeing Co., Preliminary Proxy Statement 36-37 (Feb. 28, 
1997), available in EDGAR, Ftlm No. 97,548,485. Boise Cascade, targeted in the 1997 sea­
son, has included a statement indicating that it is aware of the UFCW's intention to introduce 
its proposal and that the company reserves the right to exercise its discretionary authority to 
vote against the proposal if it should be presented. See Boise Cascade Corp., Definitive 
Proxy Statement 7 (Mar. 5, 1997), available in EDGAR, Ftlm No. 97,550,629. 
207. CoUNCIL OF lNSTL. !NvEsToRS LETrER, supra note 26, at 2. 
208. See id. 
209. See infra section ill.C.2. 
210. See infra section ill.C.2 for further discussion of this point. 
211. See Union Pac. Corp., supra note 194. 
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Unions may choose to do their own solicitations in favor of their 
proposals, subject to the restrictions in the federal proxy rules. 
These solicitations are conducted outside of the limitations of Rule 
14a-8 unless the proposal is presented thereunder, but they are sub­
ject to the remainder of the federal proxy rules. They can be di­
rected at the entire shareholder body or targeted to select groups of 
shareholders.212 
The principal drawback of union-sponsored independent solici­
tations is the cost - a full-scale solicitation at a large publicly 
traded corporation may cost several million dollars.213 While lower 
cost alternatives - such as a targeted solicitation of institutional 
investors - are available, they are also less likely to marshal suffi­
cient levels of support to pressure corporate management to make 
changes. 
1. Floor Proposals: Issues Raised by Rule 14a-6 and Rule 14a-9 
What obligation does a company have to disclose union­
shareholder proposals of which it is aware before the company files 
its definitive proxy materials? Three often-overlapping federal 
proxy rules may govern the disclosures contained in a company's 
proxy materials about union proposals - Rules 14a-4,214 14a-6,21s 
and 14a-9.216 In this section, we discuss some of the obligations im­
posed by Rule 14a-6 and Rule 14a-9. 
Rule 14a-6(a) compels a company to file its proxy (or informa­
tion) statements solely in definitive form for certain types of solici­
tations - the so-called "plain-vanilla" proxy statement.217 A 
company may not file a plain-vanilla proxy statement, however, if it 
comments on an actual or potential opposing stockholder solicita­
tion that would be pursued by means other than a Rule 14a-8 pro­
posal included in the registrant's proxy statement.218 Rule 14a-9, 
212. See TuoMAs & DIXON, supra note 3, § 6.02. 
213. See id. § 21.01 (presenting data on costs of recent proxy solicitations). 
214. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (1997). 
215. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1997). 
216. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1997). 
217. The types of solicitations to which Rule 14a-6(a) applies include: "(a) the election of 
directors; (b) the election, approval or ratification of accountants; (c) a shareholder proposal 
carried in the registrant's proxy statement pursuant to Rule 14a-8; and/or (d) the approval or 
ratification of a registrant's executive or director compensation plan, or amendments 
thereto." THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 6.03(D). 
218. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a). The rule makes it clear that a recommendation by the 
registrant's board that stockholders vote against a Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal will not 
defeat the exclusion. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) n3. A company's argument on the merits 
of a stockholder proposal that is not carried in its proxy statement, however, but instead is 
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the antifraud rule in the proxy regulations, requires that the com­
pany's disclosures or omissions concerning any shareholder propo­
sal not be false or misleading.219 
When a company learns of a possible union challenge to be 
mounted independently of Rule 14a-8 reasonably well in advance 
of its solicitation of proxies for an otherwise routine annual meet­
ing, several legal issues are raised. For union-shareholder resolu­
tions made outside of Rule 14a-8, the courts have prohibited 
companies from filing plain-vanilla proxy materials that do not dis­
close the proposals. In Shoen v. AMERC0,220 a federal district 
court ruled that a company violated Rules 14a-6 and 14a-9 by at­
tempting to avoid the preliminary-filing requirement simply by fail­
ing to disclose that a shareholder intended to present a proposal for 
a shareholder vote at the annual shareholders' meeting. In that 
case, the court granted a preliminary injunction after finding that 
the company's failure to describe in its proxy statement three non­
Rule 14a-8 proposals, which management was aware would be 
raised at the scheduled shareholders' meeting by a shareholder, did 
not permit plain-vanilla treatment of this document.221 Even if the 
company has properly filed a definitive proxy statement before 
learning of a possible union solicitation, it nevertheless may run 
afoul of Rule 14a-9 or Rule 14a-4(c) unless it provides stockholders 
with reasonable notice of this development through the filing and 
distribution of a supplemental proxy statement and form of proxy 
that allows stockholders to give voting directions on the new 
matter.222 
The interplay of Rules 14a-9 and 14a-4 was well-illustrated in a 
recent case involving a contested election of directors. In 
Chambers v. Briggs & Stratton Corporation, 223 the court granted 
the subject of an independent solicitation by the proponent or other person, ordinarily will 
bar plain-vanilla treatment. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) n.3. 
219. See Fountain v. Avondale Indus., Inc., C.A. No. 95-1198, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5598, at *4-*5 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 1995) (holding that Rule 14a-9 requires that the company 
make full and fair disclosure about the proposal if it chooses to comment on it). 
220. 885 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Nev. 1994). 
221. See 885 F. Supp. at 1346. For further discussion of this case, and its implications for 
shareholders under Rule 14a-6 and 14a-9, see THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 6.03(D) 
n.80. 
222. As we discuss in the next section, shareholder proposals that are presented to a vote 
by means other than Rule 14a-8 are subject to the discretionary voting standards of Rule 14a-
4(c)(l). This rule bars a registrant from using discretionary power to vote against such a 
proposal if it has received reasonable notice thereof prior to the solicitation but has failed 
nonetheless to seek voting instructions with respect to the proposal. See United Mine Work­
ers v. Pittston Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'i 94,946 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 24, 1989); see also THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 9.0l(E)(3). 
223. 863 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
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the plaintiff shareholder's motion for a preliminary injunction, find­
ing that the company violated Rule 14a-9 by failing to identify the 
plaintiff as a board candidate in its proxy statement, even though he 
gave the company advance notice of his candidacy pursuant to the 
shareholder-nomination provisions of its by-laws. It ordered the 
company to disseminate a supplemental proxy statement identify­
ing the plaintiff.224 The company was not required under Rule 14a-
4, however, to include a reference to the plaintiff's candidacy in its 
form of proxy.225 
What happens when the union-shareholder proposals are origi­
nally submitted under Rule 14a-8, but subsequently the union seeks 
to submit them as floor proposals without complying with Rule 14a-
8? In these circumstances, Rule 14a-6 permits a company to file its 
proxy statement solely in definitive form when it omits a Rule 14a-8 
union proposal from its proxy statement based on a SEC no-action 
letter, even if it plans to vote against the proposal if it is the subject 
of an independent solicitation conducted by the union or rule the 
proposal out of order if it is introduced from the floor at the stock­
holders' meeting.226 The SEC has taken the position, however, that 
the company must either make full disclosure in its definitive proxy 
statement of its intention to vote against the proposal or forgo the 
exercise of discretionary voting authority for that purpose.221 
For unions acting as shareholders, these legal principles have 
several implications when the unions pursue shareholder resolu­
tions outside of Rule 14a-8. First, if the union provides the com­
pany with reasonable advance notice of its non-Rule 14a-8 proposal 
before the company issues its proxy materials, then the company 
must file proxy materials that disclose the union proposal.228 Sec-
224. See 863 F. Supp. at 906-07. 
225. See Chambers v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 883 F. Supp. 374, 376-78 (E.D. Wis. 1995) 
(declining to find on cross-motions for summary judgment that Rule 14a-4(b)(2) compelled 
inclusion of an opposition candidate's name in the company's form of proxy). 
The SEC has also taken the position that a registrant is not required by Item 7 of Sched­
ule 14A to include in its proxy statement the names of any nominees other than those for 
which the soliciting person is seeking proxy authority. See American Socy. of Corp. Secretar­
ies, SEC Interp. Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 265 (Feb. 27, 1996). But the SEC declined 
to address a company's Rule 14a-9 obligation, if any, to make such disclosure. See also 
THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 6.04(B)(6) n.205. 
226. See DIVISION OF CoRP. FIN., SEC, PROXY RULES REFERENCE BooK 37-38 (1980) 
[hereinafter PROXY RULES REFERENCE BooK]. 
227. See id. 
228. If the company wishes to exercise discretionary voting authority, it must (1) furnish 
some minimum level of disclosure in its proxy statement to fulfill both Rule 14a-9 and 14a-4 
requirements; (2) articulate its position on the proposal; and (3) include a separate item in its 
form of proxy enabling shareholders to give voting instructions. See United Mine Workers v. 
Pittston Co., [1989-1990 'fransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 94,946 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 
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ond, if the union advises the company of its intention to submit the 
proposal at the shareholders' meeting after the company has issued 
its definitive proxy materials but reasonably well in advance of the 
meeting, then the company may be forced to issue a supplemental 
proxy statement and card or forgo the exercise of discretionary vot­
ing authority. Finally, if (1) the shareholder proposal is initially 
submitted as a Rule 14a-8 proposal, (2) the company obtains a no­
action letter permitting it to omit the proposal from the proxy 
materials, and (3) the union decides to present the proposal at the 
shareholders' meeting, then the company may file a definitive proxy 
statement, subject to Rule 14a-4's and Rule 14a-9's restrictions. 
Companies will rarely, if ever, be willing to give up their ability to 
exercise discretionary voting power, which makes the scope of a 
company's obligations under Rule 14a-4 a critical question. 
2. Floor Proposals: Discretionary Voting and Rule 14a-4 
Under state law, labor and other shareholders can submit pro­
posals for shareholder approval at the annual shareholders' meet­
ing, subject to compliance with any applicable bylaw provisions. 
When these matters aris� at the meeting, the company's proxy 
materials may not have informed shareholders about them, and the 
company's proxy agents must rely on the discretionary authority 
conferred by the form of proxy in voting on any matter that re­
quires shareholder action. Rule 14a-4(c)229 affords some latitude to 
the company's proxy agent in this and certain other circumstances 
by allowing the exercise of discretionary voting power for desig­
nated actions.23o 
Rule 14a-4(c)(1) provides companies and other soliciting per­
sons some flexibility to cope with the emergence of unanticipated 
1989); see also Robert T. Lang et al., Shareholder Initiatives: Proposals and Solicitations, in 4 
SECURITIES LAw TECHNIQUES: TRANSACTIONS AND LmGATION § 53.05(3)(b), at 53-151 
(A.A. Sommer, Jr. ed., 1997). 
229. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c) (1997). 
230. This power is limited to the following matters: 
(1) Matters which the persons making the solicitation do not know, a reasonable time 
before the solicitation, are to be presented at the meeting, if a specific statement to that 
effect is made in the proxy statement or form of proxy; 
(2) Approval of the minutes of the prior meeting if such approval does not amount to 
ratification of the action taken at that meeting; 
(3) The election of any person to any office for which a bona fide nominee is named 
in the proxy statement and such nominee is unable to serve or for good cause will not 
serve[;) 
(4) Any proposal omitted from the proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to 
[Rule 14a-8) or [14a-9) of this chapter[; and) 
(5) Matters incident to the conduct of the meeting. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c). 
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matters that arise shortly before or during the meeting.231 Invoking 
this provision requires full disclosure - in either the proxy state­
ment or form of proxy - of the proxy holder's intent to exercise 
discretionary authority on any such matter.232 However, it "gener­
ally denies management the ability to use discretionary voting au­
thority with respect to shareholder proposals as to which it had 
received adequate notice a reasonable time before the meeting."233 
Professor Coffee has argued that the rule should be enforced 
strictly.234 If Professor Coffee is correct, then once a company be­
comes aware of a non-Rule 14a-8 proposal raised by a union after 
the company's proxy cards have been delivered to shareholders, but 
within "a reasonable time before the solicitation," it must either (1) 
include this matter in a revised proxy card and disseminate it to 
shareholders with accompanying explanatory soliciting material, 
thus giving shareholders a meaningful opportunity to revoke any 
previously executed proxy granting discretionary authority;23s or 
(2) if the matter is not so included in the card, forgo entirely the 
exercise of discretionary power on the matter.236 
231. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 1823, 1938 SEC 
LEXIS 678, at *3-*4 (Aug. 11, 1938). Discretionary authority is permitted to be exercised 
under (c}(l) only with respect to proposals initiated by persons other than the proxy holder. 
See Proxy Rules - Comprehensive Review, Exchange Act Release No. 23,789, [1986-1987 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'JI 84,044, at 88,331 (Nov. 10, 1986). Some years 
earlier, the SEC's Division of Corporation Fmance took the position that a registrant's board 
may not rely on this provision to act on any registrant-proposed matter other than those 
incidental to the conduct of the meeting. See PROXY RuLES REFERENCE BooK, supra note 
226, at 36. 
232. See 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-4(c}(l). 
233. Coffee, supra note 177. 
234. See id. 
235. See United Mine Workers v. Pittston Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 'l! 94,946 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989); PRoXY RULES REFERENCE BooK, supra note 
226, at 35. The Division of Corporation Fmance has indicated that previously granted prox­
ies need not be invalidated where the new proxies are circulated to permit revocation of such 
proxies in accordance with applicable state law. Thus, any old proxies not superseded by 
later-dated proxies may be tabulated. See PRoXY RULES REFERENCE BooK, supra note 226, 
at 35-36; see also Larkin v. Baltimore Bancorp, 769 F. Supp. 919, 927 (D. Md. 1991} (ac­
cepting as sufficient, for purposes of Rule 14a-4( c )(1), management's circulation of new cards 
providing the opportunity to revoke previously granted discretionary authority in light of 
last-minute dissident solicitation and describing this as "the 'authority is effective until re­
voked' " approach, rather than requiring the invalidation of all proxies already given to man­
agement}, affd., 948 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1991). 
236. See PROXY RULES REFERENCE BooK, supra note 226, at 35; see also Pittston Co., 
[1989-1990 'fransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,273 (rejecting defendant Pittston's 
argument that it could not make the "specific statement" in its proxy statement or form of 
proxy contemplated by Rule 14a-4(c)(l}, because it had not yet received "the actual text of 
[the union's] proposals" and therefore could not furnish the text thereof to shareholders in its 
proxy statement). 
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For the union-shareholder proponent, the question of whether it 
has provided adequate notice of a previously unknown agenda item 
to the registrant within "a reasonable time before the solicitation," 
and thereby has precluded the exercise of discretionary authority 
under Rule 14a-4(c)(l) pursuant to earlier-dated proxies, will tum 
on the facts and circumstances of a particular solicitation. In the 
leading case, United Mine Workers of America v. Pittston Co.,237 the 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff union. In 
its opinion, the court found that the company had received notice of 
the union's intent to present four resolutions at the annual meeting 
prior to delivering its proxy statement to shareholders by mail but 
that the company did not see the actual text of the resolutions and 
supporting statements until after the mailing.238 While Pittston's 
proxy statement noted the substance of the resolutions and an­
nounced the company's plan to vote discretionary authority against 
the resolutions were they to be presented properly at the meeting, 
the company's card did not afford shareholders an opportunity to 
vote on any of them.239 
Meanwhile, the plaintiff union obtained a temporary restraining 
order forcing the company to mail the union's own soliciting mater­
ials, including a form of proxy that contained a mechanism for 
shareholders to vote on its resolutions as well as management's un­
contested board slate and request for auditor ratification.240 En­
closed in Pittston's mailing of the union's materials, effected 
twenty-six days before the meeting, was a company card that omit­
ted these resolutions, even though the existence of the resolutions 
- albeit not their substance or text - and the company's opposi­
tion were noted in an accompanying letter from the company.241 A 
subsequent follow-up letter from the company to shareholders like­
wise failed to rectify this omission. The district court denied the 
union's motion to enjoin the meeting, however, on the ground that 
the company's intent to exercise discretionary authority violated 
the proxy rules, thus allowing the meeting to proceed as 
scheduled.242 
237. [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'JI 94,946 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 
1989). 
238. See [1989-1990 'fransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95;273. 
239. See [1989-1990 'fransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95;267. 
240. See [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95;267. 
241. See [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,267-68. 
242. See [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95;268. 
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Several weeks after the court rendered its decision, the SEC 
staff warned in a letter to Pittston that such exercise had violated 
Rule 14a-4, and the SEC asked the company to indicate what re­
sponsive action it intended to take.243 The court reached a similar 
conclusion, holding that "Pittston was capable of providing share­
holders with a new proxy card that would allow voters to vote on 
each [union] resolution as they saw fit rather than to grant blanket 
discretionary authority to the Company."244 
The SEC recently suggested, however, that management does 
not always need to include a shareholder floor proposal on the 
company's ballot in order to exercise discretionary voting authority. 
A recent SEC no-action letter has been interpreted "by some prac­
titioners to imply that discretionary voting authority can still be uti­
lized by management, when management informs the shareholders 
how it intends to vote and the insurgent does not solicit a majority 
of the shareholders."245 In a no-action letter to Idaho Power Com­
pany the SEC staff examined that company's obligation to carry on 
its proxy card a non-Rule 14a-8 proposal.246 It conditioned the 
company's obligation to carry the matter on its proxy card upon the 
proponent's "deliver[y of] a proxy statement and form of proxy to 
holders of a majority of shares entitled to vote on the matter or, if a 
greater percentage is required under applicable law to carry the 
proposal, holders of the minimum required."247 The SEC con­
cluded that, under these conditions, if the registrant either has been 
given adequate prior notice of the proponent's intent to solicit 
proxies pursuant to an advance notice bylaw or, absent such a by­
law, within a reasonable time before the shareholders' meeting, 
243. See [1989-1990 'll"ansfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,268. 
244. [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,273. 
245. Coffee, supra note 177, at 7 (citing Idaho Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 
WL 114545 (Mar. 13, 1996)). 
246. See Idaho Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 114545, at *8-*9 (Mar. 13, 
1996). 
247. Idaho Power Co., 1996 WL 114545, at *9. Thus, a proponent who is conducting a 
targeted non-exempt solicitation of less than a majority of the registrant's shareholders or an 
exempt solicitation of 10 or fewer shareholders under Rule 14a-2(b )(2), or who is engaging in 
an exempt solicitation under Rule 14a-2(b)(l), will not be able to invoke Rule 14a-4(c)(l) as 
a basis for "piggy-backing" on the registrant's card. 
Furthermore, the Idaho Power no-action letter does not appear to require the company to 
make full disclosure about the union proposal - as contrasted with the disclosure necessary 
to preserve discretionary authority under Rule 14a-4(c)(l) - unless the union is circulating 
its own proxy statement and card to stockholders holding a majority of the shares entitled to 
vote on the matter. If the company claims that the union has not made the necessary solicita­
tion when the company files its proxy statement, then the company could include only mini­
mal disclosures in the proxy statement about the "nature of the proposal," see 1996 WL 
114545, at *9, and later "cure" any defect in the initial proxy materials by making a supple­
mental filing. The company may believe that it gains a tactical advantage by doing so. 
1070 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1018 
then the proposal must be carried on the registrant's form of 
proxy.24s 
Companies may prefer to recirculate a card bearing the new 
matter to enable shareholders to express their views without having 
to execute the union's form of proxy. Pope & Talbot employed this 
tactic in the 1996 proxy season.249 Any unrevoked proxy returned 
prior to recirculation therefore may be voted against the matter 
pursuant to discretionary authority.250 In the event the union, for 
strategic or other purposes, does not notify the company of its pro­
posal in advance of the printing or mailing of the definitive proxy 
statement and card, the company must file and deliver a supple­
mental proxy piece and new card giving shareholders the opportu-
248. In a recent speech, SEC Commissioner Steven M.H. Wallman advocated the amend­
ment of Rule 14a-4(c)(l) to permit companies to vote discretionary authority against Idaho 
Power-style "late resolutions" - shareholder proposals that are not presented under Rule 
14a-8, without having to carry such dissident proposals on their cards, so long as there is 
sufficient proxy-statement disclosure of the proposal and the intended use of discretionary 
authority. See Steven M.H. Wallman, Reflections on Shareholder Proposals: Correcting the 
Past; Thinking of the Future, in 2 PREPARATION OF ANNuAL D1sCLosuRE Doct.JMENTS 419, 
431-32 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-970, 1997) (remarks to the 
Council of Institutional Investors in Chicago, Illinois, Oct. 8, 1996). This suggestion was part 
of a broader model for reform of Rule 14a-8. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, § 16. 
A similar proposal has been formally issued for notice and comment by the full Commis­
sion. FJrst, the SEC has proposed to amend Rule 14a-4(c)(l) to substitute the "reasonable 
time" standard with a clear date after which notice will be deemed inadequate. The revised 
provision would allow a company voting discretion if it did not receive notice of a potential 
solicitation at least 45 days prior to the date the company first mailed its proxy materials to 
shareholders for the prior year's annual meeting. See SEC Proposals, supra note 150, at *21. 
Because shareholders typically would not have access to information setting the company's 
mailing date for the prior year's annual meeting, the SEC also proposes to change Rule 14a-
5(e) to require that companies disclose in their proxy materials the date by which notice must 
be received. See id. at *24. Bylaw provisions authorized by state law that fix a different 
definition of advance notice would override the notice requirement in Rule 14a-4(c)(l). See 
id. at *21. 
Second, the SEC has proposed a new paragraph, 14a-4(c)(2), to address the circumstances 
under which a company receiving adequate notice of a non-Rule 14a-8 proposal may exercise 
its discretionary voting authority. In order to exercise such authority, the company's proxy 
materials must include "a discussion of the nature of the matters and how the company in­
tends to exercise its discretion on each matter" in the proxy statement, and "a cross-reference 
to the discussion in the proxy statement and a box allowing shareholders to withhold discre­
tionary authority from management to vote on the same matter(s)" on the proxy card. Id. at 
*22. Companies would still have the obligation imposed by Rule 14a-9 to provide sharehold­
ers with sufficient information to make informed voting decisions and to provide a meaning­
ful opportunity to review information. See id. These materials would have to be filed in their 
preliminary form and be subject to staff review. Thus, the SEC would no longer allow com­
panies to file proxy materials in definitive form despite prior notification, even if the materi­
als disclose the nature of the proposal and how the company intends to exercise its 
discretionary authority. See id. 
These proposals are the subject of public comment at the time of this writing. 
249. See Pope & Talbot, Definitive Additional Materials (Apr. 12, 1996), available in 
EDGAR, Film No. 96,546,521. 
250. See PROXY RULES REFERENCE BooK, supra note 226, at 35-36. 
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nity to revoke previously cast proxies if the union solicits holders of 
more than a majority of the company's stock.251 
A company can only use Rule 14a-4(c)(4) as the basis for exer­
cising discretionary authority for "[a]ny proposal omitted from the 
proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to [Rules 14a-8 or 14a-
9]."252 If a shareholder proposal is initially submitted to the com­
pany under Rule 14a-8 and the SEC issues a no-action letter, then 
the company may omit the proposal from its proxy materials.253 If 
the company intends to exercise discretionary authority to vote on 
the excluded proposal if it is subsequently presented by the union 
on the floor at the meeting, however, then the SEC has taken the 
position that the company must have disclosed fully in its proxy 
statement the possibility that the excluded shareholder proposal 
might be raised at the meeting and that, in such event, the proxy 
will be voted in the discretion of the holder in order to exercise 
discretionary authority under this rule.254 
251. A pending federal action brought by UNITE raises the question of when a company 
can follow this procedure. The complaint alleges that the company was given notice of the 
shareholder's proposal "reasonably in advance" of the annual meeting and before mailing its 
proxy materials and was told that the union intended to solicit at least a majority of the 
company's outstanding shares. See Complaint, UNITE v. The May Dept Stores Co., 97 Civ. 
2120 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 30, 1997). The company and the union dispute the outcome of the 
vote on the proposal. See May, Union Dispute a Shareholders' Vote on Poison Pill Plan, 
WALL ST. J., May 27, 1997, at A6. 
252. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-4(c)(4) (1997). 
253. See Grimes v. Ohio Edison Co., 992 F.2d 455, 456 (2d Cir. 1993); Grimes v. Center­
ior Energy Corp., 909 F.2d 529, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
254. See Pacific Enters., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286196 (Nov. 9, 1990); Loss & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 140, at 1968 n.124 (suggesting that Rule 14a-4(c)(5) is the basis for 
exercising discretionary authority in this situation); PRoxv RULES REFERENCE BooK, supra 
note 226, at 37-38; see also Lang et al., supra note 228, § 53.05(3), at 53-144 n.140 (citing the 
example of Consolidated Freightways's decision to include in its 1994 proxy statement disclo­
sure of shareholder proposals despite the Division of Corporation Fmance's grant of Rule 
14a-8 no-action relief). The registrant's obligation to furnish this disclosure "does not de­
pend on whether the security holder has advised the issuer of his intention to raise the matter 
at the meeting notwithstanding its exclusion from the proxy statement" PROXY RuLES REF­
ERENCE BooK, supra note 226, at 38. 
1\vo courts of appeal have ruled that a shareholder proposal properly excluded from a 
registrant proxy statement under Rule 14a-8( c )(7) - the so-called "ordinary business" exclu­
sion, discussed in more detail in supra section III.A.2.b - need not be disclosed therein for 
Rule 14a-9 purposes, despite the proponent's stated intention to present the excluded propo­
sal at the shareholders' meeting. See Ohio Edison Co., 992 F.2d at 458; Centerior Energy 
Corp., 909 F.2d at 533. Neither decision specifically addressed the Rule 14a-4 discretionary 
authority question. 
For a more detailed discussion of the circumstances in which discretionary proxy voting 
authority may be exercised by registrants within the parameters of Rule 14a-4 and state law 
- whether with respect to a shareholder proposal omitted from a registrant's proxy state­
ment in reliance upon the staff Rule 14a-8 no-action process, or any other matter of which 
the registrant has received reasonable notice in advance of the shareholders' meeting or 
other date of shareholder action, in the case of consents or authorizations - see THOMAS & 
DIXON, supra note 3, §§ 9.0l(E)(3), 15.05. 
1072 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1018 
From the union shareholder's perspective, the company's ability 
to exercise discretionary authority will tum on whether a share­
holder proposal has been presented under Rule 14a-8. Thus, in the 
Pittston case, the plaintiff union's resolutions had never been sub­
mitted for inclusion in the company's proxy statement under Rule 
14a-8 and thus could not be deemed excluded or excludable pursu­
ant to any of the bases enumerated in Rule 14a-8(c).255 The court 
found irrelevant the fact that such proposals could have been 
presented via Rule 14a-8.256 
The end result of this analysis is that a union can advise the 
company in advance of its intent to present a proposal at the meet­
ing without invoking Rule 14a-8, thereby blocking the company's 
ability to use discretionary authority under Rule 14a-4(c)(4) to vote 
proxies against the proposal. The company must tum to Rule 14a-
4(c)(l) in order to exercise discretionary authority, which requires 
it to carry the proposal on its card and provide sufficient notice to 
the shareholders of the proposal in its proxy statement, provided 
the shareholder satisfies the conditions imposed by the Idaho Power 
no-action letter.257 
D. "Just Vote No" Campaigns 
In "Just Vote No" campaigns, shareholders withhold approval 
from the company's unopposed board slate at the annual election of 
directors to pressure management to improve its performance.258 
Although these campaigns have largely symbolic value, the nega­
tive publicity generated may provide a strong impetus for govern­
ance-related changes.259 Unions and other institutional 
shareholders have actively participated in these campaigns, spot-
255. See United Mine Workers v. Pittston Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 'J[ 94,946, at 95;2.71-72 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989). 
256. See Pittston Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,271-
95,272. 
257. But cf. Wallman, supra note 248, at 431-32 (criticizing this practice). 
258. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing With 
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1993). 
259. See Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, Exchange Act Release 
No. 30,849, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'J[ 85,002, at 82,838 (June 24, 
1992) (recognizing increasing shareholder use of this tactic to communicate with corporate 
management, and proposing enhanced disclosure of proxy voting results, including the 
number of votes withheld from each board candidate, in the next quarterly report on Form 
10-Q or Form 10-K). This new disclosure requirement was adopted in October 1992. See 
THOMAS & DxxoN, supra note 3, § 6.04(B)(19) n.334; see also Lang et al., supra note 228, 
§§ 53.02(l)(b )(ii) & (vi) (finding that announcements of voting intent can influence the votes 
of other shareholders); John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance 
and Corporate Contro� 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1052 & n.194 (1993). 
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lighting certain companies and selected issues sqch as executive 
compensation. 
For example, shareholders of the Walt Disney Company re­
cently used a "Just Vote No" campaign to protest that company's 
"multimillion dollar payout to former President Michael Ovitz and 
a rich new contract for Chairman and Chief Executive Michael 
Eisner." 260 Institutional and individual shareholders withheld thir­
teen percent of the votes cast for the five company directors that 
were up for reelection at the meeting, while eight percent of the 
shareholders voted against Eisner's new contract. 261 
In 1995, shareholder "Just Vote No" campaigns garnered sub­
stantial support. At the Archer Daniel Midlands 1995 annual meet­
ing, nearly twenty percent of the votes cast opposed management's 
slate of directors. 26 2 Shareholders at W.R. Grace & Company's 
1995 annual meeting withheld nineteen percent of the votes cast for 
the reelection of four directors. 263 
Unions can participate in these campaigns without triggering the 
federal proxy rules solicitation provisions if the unions are careful 
to stay within the terms of certain safe harbors. Rule 14a-1(l)(2)(iv) 
provides that published or broadcast announcements by union and 
other stockholders, who otherwise are not soliciting proxies, of how 
they plan to vote on any matter submitted for stockholder approval 
are exempted from the definition of solicitation. 264 This regulatory 
safe harbor extends to a union shareholder's announced reasons for 
its decision to vote, abstain, or withhold proxies. 
A second prong of the safe harbor protects a union pension 
fund that communicates its voting intentions to its beneficiaries or 
260. Bruce Orwall, Disney Holders Decry Payouts at Meeting, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1997, 
at A3. 
261. See id. An additional 3.2% abstained from voting. 
262. See id. 
263. See id. 
264. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(l)(2)(iv) (1997). Rule 14a-l(l)(2)(iv) provides that the 
terms "solicit" and "solicitation" do not apply to: 
A communication by a security holder who does not otherwise engage in a proxy 
solicitation (other than a solicitation exempt under § 240.14a-2) stating how the security 
holder intends to vote and the reasons therefor, provided that the communication: 
(A) Is made by means of speeches in public forums, press releases, published or 
broadcast opinions, statements, or advertisements appearing in a broadcast media, or 
newspaper, magazine or other bona fide publication disseminated on a regular basis, 
(B) Is directed to persons to whom the security holder owes a fiduciary duty in con­
nection with the voting of securities of the registrant held by the security holder, or 
(C) Is made in response to unsolicited requests for additional information with re­
spect to a prior communication by the security holder made pursuant to this paragraph 
(l)(2)(iv). 
17 C.F.R. 14a-l(l)(2)(iv). 
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other persons to whom it owes a fiduciary duty in connection with 
the voting of portfolio securities.265 Written or oral reiterations of a 
public announcement previously made under the safe harbor are 
covered also, but only if responsive to unsolicited requests for infor­
mation with respect to the earlier exempt announcement. An un­
limited number of exempt statements relating to a specific 
solicitation may be made, provided that proxy authority is not being 
sought. 
We suspect that labor unions have been heavily involved in 
these "Just Vote No" campaigns, either by supporting other share­
holders' initiatives or by initiating them. These voting initiatives 
typically take place at companies where executive compensation 
levels are sufficiently high to concern other shareholders. Labor's 
interest in these battles could be twofold: to protect the value of its 
capital investment from management self-enrichment and to point 
out the inequities of management's negotiating position in negotiat­
ing compensation for rank-and-file workers. 
N. CHECKS ON LABOR-SHAREHOLDERS' 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Labor unions often face a potential conflict of interest when 
they act as shareholders. On the one hand, they could be attempt­
ing to increase firm value in order to maximize their residual share 
as shareholders. On the other hand, they could be sacrificing their 
shareholder value in order to protect jobs or otherwise help their 
members. 
In some situations, no apparent conflict exists between unions' 
dual roles. For example, some companies whose stock is held by 
union pension funds have no unionized workers or ongoing or pro­
spective unionization campaigns. At other companies, labor unions 
and management may have a reasonably harmonious relationship, 
so that labor does not need to protect worker interests at the ex­
pense of other shareholders. Under these circumstances, when la­
bor groups are initiating corporate-governance reform measures or 
other voting initiatives, labor is more likely to be acting as monitors 
of corporate management seeking to reduce the agency costs of 
equity. 
In other cases, a conflict of interest clearly exists. Workers and 
management may have bitter historical relationships, or there may 
be ongoing or anticipated disputes over critical worker issues. In 
265. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l{l){2){iv). 
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fact, as we have discussed above, labor has targeted some of its 
shareholder initiatives at companies where it is concurrently en­
gaged in collective bargaining negotiations or union organizing 
campaigns. In these circumstances, corporate management and 
other shareholders may suspect- that union-shareholder activism is 
just another form of leverage in labor negotiations. 
Despite the potential conflict of interest, powerful forces con­
strain potential labor-shareholder opportunism and limit the con­
flicts that arise between labor qua shareholder and labor qua union. 
In this section, we examine three sets of legal and market forces 
that act as checks on opportunistic union shareholder conduct: (1) 
the fiduciary obligations of pension fund trustees; (2) labor's need 
to persuade other shareholders to vote for its shareholder initia­
tives; and (3) the capital market, the market for corporate control, 
and international product competition. 
A. Fiduciary and Other Checks on Taft-Hartley Pension Funds 
At the outset, it may be useful to clarify the meaning of the term 
union pension fund. Pension funds can be divided broadly into 
public- and private-sector funds. Some of the largest and most ac­
tive institutional investors today are the public pension funds, with 
CalPERS being the paradigm activist investor.266 Even though 
public-sector unions sometimes influence these public-employee 
pension plans, public-employee pension funds are not generally 
considered to be union pension funds. 
Private-sector employees have two main types of pension plans. 
Most plans are corporate pension plans, whereby the corporation 
appoints the plan trustees who run the plan. Typically the trustees 
are officers of the corporation. Many of these corporate plans arise 
from collective bargaining negotiations, but the union's only role is 
to bargain over the level of contribution or benefits.267 The union 
has no formal control over the plans. Again, these are not generally 
considered union pension funds. 
Union pension funds are the other main type of private pension 
plans. Their structure is mandated by section 302 of the Taft-
266. Other public pension funds rarely engage in shareholder activism. Pension funds for 
federal government workers, for example, are required to invest in federal government se­
curities, see AFL-CIO, lNvEsTMENT OF UNION PENSION FUNDS 19 (1981), and thus are un­
concerned with private-sector corporate governance. 
267. It has been estimated that up to two-thirds of all private pension funds involve col­
lective bargaining. See id. at 20 tbl.l. The General Motors pension fund is an example of a 
corporate fund that comes from collective bargaining. 
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Hartley Act,268 and so they are often referred to as "Taft-Hartley" 
plans. The Taft-Hartley Act forbids employers from making pay­
ments of any kind to a union,269 including union-run pension 
funds,210 but makes an exception for pension funds that have equal 
numbers of trustees appointed by management and the union and 
meet certain other requirements.211 Perhaps forty percent of all 
collectively bargained plans are joint trustee plans.212 The Depart­
ment of Labor estimated that in 1992 there were 3,109 Taft-Hartley 
pension funds that collectively held approximately $215 billion.213 
Sometimes they are called multi-employer pension plans, because 
most jointly managed Taft-Hartley plans involve a dominant union 
with many employers. The Teamsters Central States Pension Fund 
is a prominent example. 
The critical question here is the extent to which union pension 
funds are legally constrained from using their shareholder voting 
power to further goals other than maximizing their investment re­
turn. The securities laws, especially Rule 14a-8, address limits on 
what subjects unions can raise on the corporate ballot in ways we 
have analyzed above. Pension law and the Taft-Hartley Act have 
said little about the issue, but the broader issue of where union pen­
sion funds can invest their funds has been the subject of considera­
ble litigation and commentary. 
The most important check on investment abuses by union pen­
sion funds, at least in theory, was the joint union-management con-
268. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1994). 
269. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2). 
270. The Taft-Hartley Act allows unions to control directly a small number of pension 
plans, but these are of minor importance. They include a few grandfathered plans in exist­
ence before 1946 to which employers had made contributions. They also include plans 
funded by the union for the pensions of its own officers and employees, such as the employ­
ees' pension plan and trust of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine 
Workers. They also can include pension plans for workers funded solely through worker 
contributions. See Richard Blodgett, Union Pension Fund Asset Management, in ABUSE ON 
WALL STREET: CONFLICTS OF IN:raREST IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS 320, 327-28 (1980). 
While these directly controlled plans deserve the title of "union pension funds," that term is 
generally reserved for the joint union-management plans discussed in the text. 
271. See 29 U.S.C. § 186. In addition to jointly managed boards, the Taft-Hartley Act 
requires that (1) the funds be held in trust for the sole benefit of the employees and their 
families and dependents; (2) a written agreement that specifies the basis on which the em­
ployer will make payments; (3) an impartial umpire who can break deadlocks in the board, 
appointed by a federal district court if the parties cannot agree on an umpire; (4) an annual 
audit; and (5) limitation of the trust to certain purposes, such as pensions, health or life 
insurance, apprenticeship training, vacation or holiday funds, day care centers, scholarships, 
and legal services. See 29 u.s.c. § 186(c); see also NOEL ARNOLD LEVIN, GUIDELINES FOR 
FIDUCIARIES OF TAFT-HARTLEY TRUSTS: AN ERISA MANuAL 3 (1980). 
272. See AFL-CIO, supra note 266, at 20 tbl.1. 
273. See Sweeney, supra note 2, at 2. 
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trol of the trustees. The Taft-Hartley Act specifically aimed to 
prevent unions from using the pension funds as a "war chest," as 
the United Mine Workers in particular was thought to have done 
with its pension plans prior to 1947.274 
Despite the balanced board membership, unions have tended to 
dominate these jointly managed funds. Indeed, it is "[ o ]ften . . .  
very difficult to distinguish between the pension fund and the 
union."275 One reason is that the union pension funds have typi­
cally been funded through fixed contributions by the employer with 
the trustees of the fund setting the pension levels.276 Whether the 
pension does well or poorly on its investment of such funds does 
not impact the employer directly. By contrast, in corporate 
defined-benefit funds, employers directly benefit from good invest­
ment performance, because they can put less money in for a given 
level of defined benefits. Because of the reduced incentives, man­
agement often has left the investment decisions to the union 
trustees. 
The Taft-Hartley Act also imposes a fiduciary duty on plan 
trustees, mandating that all payments be held in trust for the "sole 
and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families and 
dependents" and insisting that "the funds held therein cannot be 
used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annui­
ties. "277 The Taft-Hartley Act did not directly regulate where the 
pension fund could place its investments, however, and there are 
many anecdotes of union pension funds making bad or corrupt in­
vestments, although fiduciary-duty lawsuits sporadically policed 
abuses.278 
Perhaps of greater bite than the Taft-Hartley duties are the 
more recent fiduciary duties imposed by BRISA on all private 
pension-fund trustees, whether corporate or jointly managed.279 
BRISA holds trustees to a prudent-person standard and requires 
274. See Blodgett, supra note 270, at 330 (noting Senator Taft's concern that the adminis­
tration of the UMW pension and welfare fund was so unrestricted that "practically the fund 
became a war chest for the union"). 
275. Id. at 321. 
276. See id. at 322-23. 
277. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1994). 
278. In the well-known case of Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971), 
the court found a breach of the trustees' common law fiduciary duty when the United Mine 
Workers pension fund, on instructions of John L. Lewis, purchased shares in various utility 
companies to try to influence them to purchase union-mined coal. 
279. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461; 
Blodgett, supra note 270, at 323. 
1078 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1018 
diversified investments.280 In addition, it makes each trustee indi­
vidually liable for breaches of fiduciary duty,281 a threat that may 
have encouraged greater involvement by the management trustees 
on the joint board. 
Union pension funds have reacted in various ways to the ten­
sions of becoming major capitalist investors in the stock market. 
Some union pension funds historically shunned the stock market 
entirely, investing only in bonds. Others had a policy against in­
vesting in nonunion companies.282 One 1978 study showed that a 
sample of seventy-five union pension funds invested half as much as 
employer-controlled plans in fifteen predominately nonunion com­
panies.283 The economist Richard Freeman, writing in the early 
1980s,. emphasized that the policy of noninvestment costs union 
pension funds the inside shareholder pressure they might have were 
they to invest in nonunion companies.284 More recently, union pen­
sion funds have even made international investments.285 
Pension funds increasingly are indexing their investments to 
track the general return of the stock market.286 This passive strat­
egy of investment makes pension funds less able to target their in­
vestments. Union pension funds appear to be less indexed than 
other pension funds, however, perhaps so that they can make more 
targeted use of investments.287 
Indeed, a central issue for BRISA regulation of union pension 
funds involves their targeted social investments of one kind or an­
other, such as providing housing loans for union members or invest­
ing in construction projects that employ union labor.288 Much 
280. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(B), (C). 
281. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1105(c)(2)(B). 
282. This policy of investing in unionized companies was popularized in RIFKIN & 
BARBER, supra note 1. 
283. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN, UNIONS, PENSIONS, AND UNION PENSION FUNDS 44 
(National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 1226, 1983). 
284. See id. at 46. 
285. See Paul G. Barr, Teamsters Fund Invests One-Third of Assets Overseas, PENSIONS & 
INvEsTMENrs, Feb. 3, 1997, at l. 
286. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WoU<, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 
739 (2d ed. 1995) ("[T]he growth of passive investing from its inception in the early 1970s to 
its central role in modem practice has been the dominant event in the period since the enact­
ment of BRISA."); Romano, supra note 77, at 833 (noting that large funds increased portfo­
lio indexing beginning in the late 1980s). 
287. Union pension funds are often asked "to screen and actively target or exclude cer­
tain types of investments as a means of advancing the multiple and long-term economic and 
social objectives of plan participants." Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO Sup· 
ports Strong Pension Protections, Activist Investing, LABOR & INvESTMENTS, Fourth Quarter 
1993, at 3. 
288. See Simon, supra note 88, at 268. 
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litigation289 and debate290 has ensued over whether such invest­
ments are consistent with BRISA fiduciary duties. The Depart­
ment of Labor more or less consistently has advocated an "other 
things equal" test, in which pension funds can make investments 
that benefit unions or workers if the risk-adjusted return matches 
other investments.291 The latest incarnation of social investing in­
volves "economically targeted investments," the subject of a 1994 
interpretative bulletin of the Department of Labor that arguably 
encourages such investments.292 The debate over social investing293 
or economically targeted investments294 by union pension funds is 
beyond the scope of this article. The safest conclusion is that, 
289. See, e.g., Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986). The pension fund in Brock 
encountered difficulties when Florida real estate prices fell in the late 1980s. See Joel 
Chernoff, Ego Leads to Dennis Walton's Down/al� PENSIONS & INvEsrMENTS, July 8, 1991, at 
1. 
A number of other cases have discussed the compatibility of social investments and 
BRISA. See, e.g., Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(upholding Teachers' Retirement System bailout of New York City by buying $860 million of 
highly risky bonds), affd. mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); B,oard of 'Ii"ustees v. Mayor of 
Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989) (upholding South African divestiture); Regents of 
the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 419 N.W.2d 773 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a state law 
requiring South African divestiture violated the Michigan Constitution). 
290. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of "South Afri­
can" Securities, 65 NEB. L. REv. 209 (1986); James D. Hutchinson & Charles G. Cole, Legal 
Standards Governing Investment of Pensions Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1340 (1980); Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investment: Doing Good 
Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1992); John H. Langbein, 
Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprincipled, Futile, and Ille­
ga� in DISINVESTMENT, Is rr LEGAL? Is rr MoRAL? Is rr PRODUCTIVE? 1 (National Legal 
Ctr. for the Public Interest ed., 1985); John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Invest­
ing and the Law of Trusts, 19 MICH. L. REv. 72 (1980); Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment 
of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully under ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J. 387 
(1980). 
291. See John Godfrey, Pmdent Pension Trustee May Use Social Goals to Pick Invest­
ments, Reich Says, 63 TAX NoTES 1745 (1994) (" 'The Department of Labor does not condone 
the use of pension funds [in a way that subordinates financial return to some other social 
objective]. We prohibit it' If, however, risk and return are not sacrificed, a trustee may 
choose to invest money with the intention of promoting a social objective." (quoting the 
testimony of Robert L. Reich, Secretary of Labor, before the Joint Economic Committee 
(June 22, 1994))). 
292. See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard under BRISA in Con­
sidering Economically Targeted Investments, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (1997). 
293. See, e.g., lirrLEL GRAY, NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE INvEsrMENT AND CoNTROL OF 
PENSION FUNDS (1983); NOEL ARNOLD LEVIN & MARK E. BROSSMAN, SOCIAL lNvEsTING 
FOR PENSION FUNDs (1982); SoCIAL lNvEsTING (Dan M. McGill ed., 1984); Lanoff, supra 
note 290, at 389 (arguing that employment benefits to working beneficiaries is not a legiti­
mate concern of trustees, at least if it requires a reduction in the fund's rate of return). 
294. Compare Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Protecting Retirees While Encouraging Econom­
ically Targeted Investments, 5 KAN. J .L. & Pus. PoLY. 47 (1996) (arguing that the Depart­
ment of Labor appropriately continues the "all things equal" test for investing in ETis) with 
Edward A. Zelinsky, ET[, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically Targeted Invest­
ments, IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 BERKELEY J .  EMP. & LAB. L. 
333 (1995) (arguing that the new bulletin improperly diverges from prior policy). 
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within bounds, BRISA - and certainly Taft-Hartley - allows 
union pension funds to invest in projects that benefit workers, so 
long as the risk and return is similar to other projects. 
While union pension funds long have worried about where their 
money is invested, until recently they have paid relatively little at­
tention to their voting power as shareholders. For example, a sur­
vey of union pension fund directors published by the AFL-CIO in 
1981 found little awareness of the potential power of shareholder 
votes.295 Some commentators have attributed pension funds' pas­
sivity to the tight fiduciary duties of BRISA. Writing in 1990, Pro­
fessor Black noted in an influential article that the Department of 
Labor "had been silent on the basic question of whether an BRISA 
fiduciary can ever spend plan money to promote a shareholder pro­
posal," and suggested that no BRISA fiduciary had ever done so.296 
While a few union pension plans had made proposals by 1990,297 
Black's statement reflects the general spirit that shareholder activ­
ism was beyond the scope of union and other BRISA-regulated 
pension funds. 
The voting passivity of the 1980s clearly changed in the 1990s. 
In 1991, the AFL-CIO issued model proxy-voting and investment 
guidelines in which it encouraged its members to push more activist 
agendas.298 This was followed in 1992 by the Industrial Union De­
partment of the AFL-CIO passing a resolution urging "workers and 
their representatives to take a more active role in the governance of 
their corporations and in responsible investing and proxy voting by 
pension plans."299 A similar resolution called for the use of "coor­
dinated campaigns in demanding corporate responsibility."30o 
295. See AFL-CIO, supra note 266, at 42 ("The proposition that the rights associated with 
ownership might be used to directly influence corporate behavior was by and large a new 
idea to those surveyed."). 
296. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 554-55 
(1990). Black noted that the Department of Labor has required pension plans to vote their 
shares but has not encouraged plans to make their own proposals. See id. at 554. 
297. See Ethan G. Stone, Note, Must We Teach Abstinence?: Pensions' Relationship In­
vestments and the Lessons of Fiduciary Duty, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 2222, 2242 (1994) (challeng­
ing Black's passivity claim by noting that pension plans associated with the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters were prominent shareholder activists of the late 1980s and spon­
sored many proposals). 
298. See Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power: Recent Developments in 
the Use of Proxy Voting to Influence Corporate Governance, 7 LAB. LAW. 771, 773-75 (1991). 
299. Patrick S. McGum, Growth of Union Activism Is Byproduct of the 1980s, CORP. 
GOVERNANCE BuLL., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 5, 6 (quoting resolutions from the IUD's Constitu­
tional Convention in 1992). 
300. Id. 
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The U.S. Department of Labor's issuance of proxy voting 
guidelines further encouraged the rise in labor shareholder activ­
ism.301 In a 1994 interpretative bulletin, the Department of Labor 
advocated a corporate-activist role for private pension funds.302 In­
vestors were urged to monitor or influence corporate management 
when such activities would be likely to enhance the value of invest­
ments.303 The Department of Labor suggested issues to raise in 
shareholder proposals, including the independence and expertise of 
candidates for boards of directors, executive compensation, the na­
ture of long-term business plans, and corporate policies regarding 
mergers and acquisitions.304 While the directive is imprecise about 
whether union-fund trustees can sacrifice investment returns for 
other goals,305 the general spirit is to allow union pension funds to 
flex their power somewhat. 
In short, BRISA does impose some limits on how far union pen­
sion funds can push shareholder resolutions. Cost-justified expend­
itures on resolutions dealing With corporate-governance issues are 
allowable. But union pension funds risk BRISA litigation when 
they sponsor resolutions that clearly can be shown to provide low 
returns. 
BRISA, of course, only applies to the pension funds, not to the 
unions themselves. Unions can purchase stock and propose resolu­
tions without breaching BRISA fiduciary duties. While the free­
dom from BRISA constraints may push toward direct union­
shareholder activity, such actions may be less likely to succeed than 
actions by a union pension fund. Other shareholders may be suspi­
cious of a union-shareholder proposal when the union spends far 
more on the proposal than it could ever hope to recoup in invest­
ment return. Recall that Albertson's management urged this cost­
benefit calculus as a reason other shareholders should defeat a 
union proposal that related ostensibly purely to corporate govern­
ance:306 it could be a (union) wolf in (shareholder) sheep's cloth­
ing. A pension fund sponsoring a corporate-governance proposal 
301. See Patricia B. Limbacher, DOL Peeking over Proxy Shoulders, PENSIONS & !Nv:EsT­
MENTS, Mar. 6, 1995, at 1; Patrick S. McGurn, DOL Issues New Guidelines on Proxy Voting, 
Active Investing, CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL., July-Aug. 1994, at 1. 
302. See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1997). 
303. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(3). 
304. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2. 
305. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(2). 
306. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
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that could potentially earn it substantial shareholder profits may 
arouse less suspicion from other investors. 
B. Labor Needs Other Shareholders' Support for Their Voting 
Initiatives to Succeed 
Most labor voting initiatives cannot succeed without the support 
of other shareholders.307 This is most apparent in situations in 
which labor is trying to force the board of directors to take action, 
such as in the Fleming Companies case, in which the union needed 
to obtain a majority of the votes cast in order to pass its mandatory 
by-law amendment proposal. Labor needs strong support even for 
its precatory voting initiatives, such as shareholder proposals under 
Rule 14a-8, however, if it wishes to persuade a corporate board of 
directors that shareholders want it to take the actions supported by 
labor. 
Other shareholders will be more likely to support labor's voting 
initiatives when they relate to issues that have the potential to im­
prove corporate performance. By contrast, when labor groups tar­
get issues that concern uniquely labor-related interests, and not 
307. This is true whenever labor groups do not have sufficient stock ownership at a com· 
pany to bring about change solely by relying on their own voting power. In the 1996 proxy 
season, for example, the Laborers submitted a proposal to Alumax. See infra app. tbl.1. At 
that time, it held 320,000 shares of Alumax stock. See Alumax, Definitive Proxy Statement 
(Mar. 25, 1996), available in LEXIS, Corporate Library, Edgarplus File (Film No. 
96,058,465). This represented approximately 0.7% of outstanding Alumax shares. Cf. 
Alumax, 1996 Form SEC 10-K (Nov. 30, 1996), available in EDGAR, Film No. 96,674,289 • 
Other examples based on submissions noted in Table 1 include: 
Baker Hughes 
= 0.007% Carpenters' holdings - 10,000 shares (Baker Hughes Inc., Definitive 
Proxy Statement 20 (Dec. 12, 1995), available in EDGAR, Film No. 
95,601,083.) 
K-Mart 
= 0.0025% 
= 0.00008% 
WMX 
= 0.03% 
Outstanding shares - 145,149,834 
{Baker Hughes Inc., 1996 SEC Form 10-K, available in EDGAR, Film 
No. 96,678,190) 
Laborers' holdings - 12,500 shares 
UNITE and Teamsters (combined) - 390 shares (K-Mart Corp., 
Definitive Preliminary Revised Statement 21, 22 (Apr. 10, 1996), 
available in EDGAR, Film No. 96,545,773) 
Outstanding shares - 482,151,580 
(K-Mart Corp., 1996 SEC Form 10-K, available in EDGAR, Film No. 
96,544,576) 
Operating Engineers' holdings - 149,788 shares 
(WMX Technologies, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement 24, available in 
EDGAR, Film No. 96,540,167) 
Outstanding shares - 494,495,743 
(WMX Technologies, Inc., 1996 SEC Form 10-K, available in EDGAR, 
Film No. 96,541,025) 
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more general ones of all shareholders, they will probably receive 
much lower levels of shareholder voting support. 
This is not surprising. Labor will have a much harder time con­
vincing rational shareholders that it is in their best interests to vote 
for proposals that do not on their face appear to increase the value 
of a company, or that are at least value-neutral. Many shareholders 
will be skeptical of proposals that appear to benefit only labor and 
view them as unjustified diversions of corporate resources to a spe­
cial interest group. If labor unions want to build coalitions with 
other shareholders, they must be able to offer them something for 
their support. 
Furthermore, as noted above, many institutional shareholders 
must seek to maximize value for their beneficiaries and will want to 
be sure that their voting policies are directed toward approving only 
those proposals that can be directly tied to shareholder value crea­
tion. Labor may be able to demonstrate this connection systemati­
cally for certain types of proposals sufficiently well to permit 
institutional shareholders to adopt favorable voting policies.308 
When labor cannot persuasively document such a connection, insti­
tutions and other shareholders will need to evaluate individual la­
bor initiatives on a case-by-case basis, making it unlikely that labor 
will command the consistent levels of strong support that it needs to 
be effective with its voting agenda. This makes it all the more criti­
cal that labor couple its voting initiatives with its monitoring 
strengths to bring about the increases in firm value that will per­
suade other shareholders to follow its lead. 
C. Market Discipline 
Market forces act as a final check upon extreme forms of labor 
opportunism. If labor were to engage in a successful campaign of 
opportunistic behavior and to use its voting initiatives to persuade 
the board of directors to take actions that would divert substantial 
value away from shareholders to labor interests, these actions 
would have adverse consequences for the company in several differ­
ent markets. For example, if the board of directors acted to in­
crease worker pay and benefits drastically, without an offsetting 
308. At present, many institutions have voting policies in favor of many traditional corpo­
rate-governance shareholder proposals but not on other issues. See Bernard S. Black, Share­
holder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in THE NEw PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., forthcoming 1998) (noting 
that many institutional shareholders vote following the recommendation of Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) and that ISS has guidelines about which proposals it will support, 
which leads shareholder proponents to tailor their proposals to fit within these guidelines). 
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increase in productivity, and this led to subpar corporate perform­
ance, it would raise the cost of raising capital from future equity 
sales. It would also lower the value of the corporation's existing 
stock, thereby increasing the likelihood that the firm would become 
a takeover target and decreasing the incentives associated with 
many forms of employee stock-option plans. 
Product-market competition would also punish any firm that 
raised its labor costs too high. Other sellers, both domestic and in­
ternational, would enjoy a cost advantage over the company. This 
would place the firm at a competitive disadvantage when it sought 
to sell its goods on the open market. Debt financing might also be 
more difficult and costly to obtain if lenders believed that the cor­
poration faced a greater risk of failure fro,m its inability to compete 
effectively. Even labor might realize that it cannot divert too much 
of the company's value to itself without jeopardizing the very bene­
fits that it seeks: long-term job prospects and improved worker 
pay.309 
Of course, these market forces will not punish mild forms of 
labor opportunism - only more extreme ones that adversely affect 
the corporation's bottom line visibly.310 Nevertheless, they repre­
sent a very real check on runaway labor opportunism in the un­
likely event that the other checks discussed above do not operate 
effectively. 
V. Do THESE CHECKS WoRK.? 
A. Current Shareholder Initiatives 
When we examine labor's current shareholder initiatives in the 
light of the above discussion, we can observe how these checks op­
erate in practice. 
1. Traditional Corporate-Governance Proposals 
Under Rule 14a-8 
Labor corporate-governance proposals under Rule 14a-8 are the 
most heavily used form of shareholder voting initiative. Our analy­
sis suggests that this is the case for good reasons. First, many pen­
sion funds have concluded that corporate-governance reforms are 
309. If workers fear that changes of control will adversely affect their future employment, 
they may become more reserved in their demands. 
310. We should also note that, to the extent that the market for corporate control is 
impeded by antitakeover barriers, such as state antitakeover statutes, this will weaken its 
ability to act as a check on labor opportunism. 
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value-enhancing measures and have adopted voting policies in 
favor of such proposals.311 Many other shareholders appear to 
share this view. Second, labor corporate-governance proposals re­
ceive the highest levels of voting support of proposals made by any 
sponsor group.312 Furthermore, these proposals do not seem to dis­
turb the capital market, as empirical studies show that they have 
either no negative effects or small positive effects on stock prices. 
All of these factors tend to indicate that there is little potential for 
labor opportunism with Rule 14a-8 corporate-governance proposals 
and thus little need to treat them differently from other sharehold­
ers' proposals. 
2. Employment-Related Voting Initiatives 
Labor's 1996 voting initiatives at Albertson's and related com­
panies illustrate a different configuration of these forces. These 
proposals raised issues that affected labor's interests qua labor, 
although the proposals themselves were for changes in corporate­
governance structures. As a result, they received relatively strong 
levels of shareholder support.313 By contrast, when labor makes 
proposals under Rule 14a-8 that raise only employee-related issues, 
those proposals obtain less support from shareholders. 
While we lack hard evidence about why shareholders vote as 
they do on these proposals, our analysis above is consistent with the 
observed voting patterns. For example, we believe that institutional 
shareholders have voting policies that require them to vote in favor 
of corporate-governance proposals but not worker-oriented propos­
als. Tb.us, for employment-related proposals, these shareholders 
would need to consider the issues raised in these contests on a case­
by-case basis, which will reduce the number of votes automatically 
cast in favor of these proposals. Second, employment-related 
311. See Bevis Longstreth, A Look at the SEC's Adaptation to Global Market Pressures, 
33 CoLUM. J. TRANsNATI.. L. 319, 320 {1995) (noting that "the role of shareholder democracy 
in the governance process . . .  has expanded from a handful of Don Quixotes in earlier de­
cades to the large, mostly public, pension funds engaged in shareholder activism today"); 
Romano, supra note 77, at 833-36 (reporting the results of a 1990 IRRC survey of voting 
policies of public and private pension funds); Ryan, supra note 99, at 155-56 (reporting the 
results of a 1985 IRRC survey of voting policies); supra note 308. For a detailed description 
of pension funds' positions on various corporate governance proposals and the rationales 
therefor, see John Lukomnik, The New York City Board of Education Pension Fund, New 
York City Employee's Retirement System, New York City Fire Department Pension Fund and 
New York City Police Department Pension Fund: Statement of Procedures and Policies for 
Voting Proxies, in CoNTESTS FOR CoRPORATE CoNTRoL 1997, at 221, 256-68 (PLI Corp. L. 
& Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-972, 1997). 
312. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 6 (manuscript at 7-8). 
313. See infra app. tbl.3 (summarizing these data). 
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shareholder proposals raise the possibility that labor is acting in a 
self-interested manner, which should make other shareholders less 
likely to support their actions. Finally, it is difficult to determine 
what the impact of these proposals would be on financial and other 
markets because they have not been adopted by many corporations. 
H labor wants to succeed in getting these proposals adopted, it 
needs to find a way to document that they have value to the firm 
and to demonstrate that to other shareholders. 
3. Executive Compensation 
The existing corporate-governance system in American cor­
porations provides only weak oversight over the level of executive­
compensation payments.314 The dramatic increases in executive 
pay levels over the past five years have made them an easy target 
for shareholder groups. This explains in part the popularity of 
many of the "Just Vote No" campaigns.315 Labor is well positioned 
to launch a joint program with other shareholders to attack these 
payments. 
Labor may be a better monitor of executive-compensation 
levels than most shareholders. While labor unions have the same 
public information regarding executive compensation that is avail­
able to shareholders,316 their obligations at the bargaining table, 
relative expertise on compensation-related matters, and presence in 
the firm can be expected to make labor more knowledgeable than 
the average shareholder about the implications for corporate per­
formance of executive pay levels and the processes used to deter­
mine those levels. 
314. See, e.g., GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF 
AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991); Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation - A  Board· 
Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REv. 937, 981 (1993) (suggesting board self-motivation as a solu· 
tion to stimulating effective board oversight); Roger Lowenstein, On the Difficulty of Hiring 
Good Help, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1997, at Cl (reporting on the overcompensation of CEOs). 
In recent years, the SEC has become much more aggressive in requiring full disclosure to 
shareholders of executive-compensation arrangements. See THOMAS & DIXoN, supra note 3, 
§ 7 (containing a complete discussion of the SEC's executive-pay disclosure regulations). 
315. See supra section III.D. 
316. Although an employer is required to furnish the union with information that is rele­
vant to a legitimate collective bargaining need, see Emeryville Research Ctr., Shell Dev. Co. 
v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 883 {9th Cir. 1971), manager and executive compensation, unlike 
bargaining unit wage and related data, would not be considered presumptively relevant and 
thus the union would have the burden of justifying its request, cf. Brown Newspaper Publg. 
Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 187 {1978) (relying on the fact that nonbargaining unit personnel were 
similar to those in the unit in holding that the employer was required to provide compensa­
tion information). In addition, there likely would be confidentiality issues raised by an em· 
ployer facing such a request. 
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As noted in Part II, unions are well versed in the incentives -
or lack thereof - incorporated in most compensation structures 
used to pay executives. Moreover, when faced with information re­
garding executive compensation, unions' general knowledge of 
compensation mechanisms makes them better equipped to decipher 
reported information and draw conclusions regarding its implica­
tions.317 Unions' knowledge of compensation generally also allows 
them to understand that a number of systems are not reported in 
materials distributed to shareholders. 
Labor has made use of its knowledge of these issues. For exam­
ple, on April 10, 1997, the AFL-CIO launched Executive Pay Watch, 
a web site on the Internet, as part of an effort to bring issues related 
to executive compensation to the attention of the public.318 Execu­
tive Pay Watch allows individuals to compare their own salaries with 
those of corporate executives of ninety-six firms.319 The site also 
provides information on how shareholders can decipher proxy 
statements and use their proxies and the shareholder-proposal 
mechanism to encourage change.320 
Given its position as a potential monitor of corporate manage­
ment on executive compensation, will labor act in shareholders' 
best interests in pushing for changes in the existing system? At one 
level, any time that labor can form a coalition with shareholders to 
reduce management's share of the corporate income creates the po­
tential for a joint benefit for both groups. Thus, to muster share­
holder support for a campaign to reduce executive compensation, 
labor will need to use its expertise and knowledge regarding com-
317. Concern over shareholders' ability to become informed about executive compensa­
tion led the SEC in February of 1992 to announce new reporting requirements. See Breeden 
Announces SEC Initiative on Executive Compensation Issues, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), 
Feb. 21, 1992. For a discussion of the new requirements, see TuoMAS & DIXON, supra note 3, 
§ 7. 
318. See Executive PayWatch (visited Dec. 5, 1997) <http://aflcio.paywatch.org/ceopay>. 
In addition, the Teamsters' Union has issued its own study of the effectiveness of corporate 
directors that attaches significant weight to corporate performance and its relationship to 
executive pay. See OFFICE OF CoRP. AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL BRHD. OF TEAMSTERS, 
AMEruCA's LEAST VALUABLE DIRECTORS (1997); Dobrzynski, supra note 10. 
319. See Executive Paywatch, supra note 318. The site also encourages individuals to: 
"call on the regulators" to lobby for full disclosure (noting that severance benefits and de­
ferred compensation are not reported); "take it to Congress" and support Representative 
Sabo's bill that would "cap the business tax deductibility of all executive compensation . . .  to 
25 times that of the lowest paid full-time worker in the same firm"; and "rally your coworkers 
and the community." Id. It also includes a sample e-mail message to send to senators and 
representatives. See id. 
320. See id. 
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pensation to demonstrate how executive compensation systems can 
negatively affect shareholder value.321 
Lowering the rate of growth of - or absolute levels of - man­
agement compensation risks a reduction in the value of the corpo­
ration for all participants, however, if good managers leave the firm 
to go elsewhere. Management can argue that labor is attacking its 
compensation levels as a means of creating pressure on the com­
pany to accommodate labor interests at shareholders' expense. Un­
less labor can demonstrate that this is incorrect, many shareholders 
may choose to support management rather than risk the loss of val­
uable managerial talent. 
B. Implications of Labor-Shareholder Activism for the Debate 
over Director Fiduciary Duties 
In Oliver Williamson's well-known article, Corporate Govern­
ance, 322 he argues that the board of directors of a corporation 
should have a fiduciary duty only to the company's shareholders. 
Shareholders need board representation to protect their investment 
because they are the only "voluntary constituency whose relation 
with the corporation does not come up for periodic renewal," be­
cause their investment is not associated with any particular asset 
and hence difficult to protect, and because they face a significant 
risk of having their firm-specific investment expropriated.323 Other 
forms of contractual protection, in Williamson's view, are inade­
quate to safeguard shareholders' interests. 
By contrast, Williamson claims that the board of directors 
should not have a fiduciary duty to other constituencies, such as 
workers, because those groups have the ability to seek explicit or 
implicit contractual protections of their rights. Workers can act to 
protect their firm-specific investments through explicit contracts, 
such as collective bargaining agreements.324 Where such explicit 
contractual protections are unavailable, workers can negotiate im­
plicit contracts with firms to protect their firm-specific investments. 
Although firms have incentives to renege ex post on these implicit 
321. Labor needs to avoid presenting executive compensation solely as an issue of fair-
ness to workers, thereby reflecting the adversarial side of labor-management relations. 
322. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YA.LE LJ. 1197 (1984). 
323. Id. at 1210. 
324. See id. at 1208. Labor representation on the board of directors might be necessary 
for informational purposes to prevent labor agreements from drifting out of alignment. See 
id. at 1208-09. 
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agreements, reputational considerations may prevent this type of 
firm opportunism.325 
Marleen O'Connor has used Williamson's transaction-cost anal­
ysis to suggest that boards of directors should be required to con­
sider other interests beyond those of shareholders.326 In particular, 
she argues that we need to expand directors' fiduciary duties to 
consider worker interests explicitly as well as shareholder inter­
ests.327 She claims that labor needs board representation in order 
to protect its firm-specific investments.328 O'Connor believes that 
the firm's reputational interest in protecting workers' implicit con­
tracts gives them inadequate protection.329 She proposes a 
mandatory regime of "neutral referee" directors to protect employ­
ees from opportunistic conduct by firms.330 
Our analysis suggests that if unions are successful in mobilizing 
shareholder support for their voting initiatives, they may be able to 
get boards to consider labor's interests as part of their processes of 
considering shareholder interests without any dramatic changes in 
legal rules. If this is correct, it gives labor another method of seek­
ing to protect labor's firm-specific investments and implicit con­
tracts, as labor and other shareholders press management to keep 
its word. Furthermore, it suggests that labor qua shareholder 
should use its monitoring abilities to keep itself and other share­
holders advised about board actions that affect workers' firm.­
specific investments and, more generally, firm value. 
The limitations on labor-shareholder activism explored above 
also suggest the limits on labor's ability to use shareholder activism 
as a means of protecting its firm-specific investment. This will be 
easiest when labor can demonstrate that protecting its interests will 
be value enhancing - or at least value neutral - for all sharehold­
ers. This would enable it to marshal enough institutional and other 
shareholder support to press the board of directors to take specific 
actions, or at least more generally to consider labor's interests when 
325. See Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the 
Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE LJ. 173, 176 (arguing that 
nonshareholder groups can best protect their firm-specific investments by negotiating con­
tractual provisions); cf. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing 
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REy. 899, 910 
(1993) (suggesting that reputational considerations may help to enforce implicit employment 
agreements). 
326. See O'Connor, supra note 325, at 946-65. 
327. See id. at 955. 
328. See id. 
329. See id. at 911. 
330. See id. at 955-65. 
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it acts. This discussion between labor and management could take 
place using the same informal means of communication enjoyed by 
other institutional shareholders or, if that is unavailable for labor's 
use, by more formal methods. 
CONCLUSION 
Labor unions are aggressively using their ownership power to 
push corporate-governance reforms. So far, much of their activity 
is tactical. Lasting changes in corporate governance can occur if 
unions develop a more strategic model of their role in corporate 
governance. A strategic model would require unions to concentrate 
on areas where their interests coincide with other shareholders and 
where they can demonstrate that their actions will increase firm 
value. This requires that labor unions adopt a platform of maximiz­
ing long-term growth for shareholders and other stakeholders, as 
well as for themselves. In particular, unions must convince other 
shareholders that they are acting in areas where they have an infor­
mational advantage about the corporation's and management's op­
erations. If labor can demonstrate to other shareholders that it is 
using its monitoring advantages to take actions to increase firm 
value by policing management shirking and reducing the agency 
costs of equity, then other shareholders will be more willing to fol­
low its lead in future voting initiatives. This opens up the possibility 
that labor union shareholders could reinvigorate some currently in­
effectual corporate-governance systems. These might include the 
policing of securities fraud and other types of corporate misconduct 
through the use of existing litigation techniques. 
In taking on this monitoring role, however, unions transform 
themselves as well. They are already becoming sophisticated play­
ers in corporate-governance battles. These battles emphasize effi­
ciency and firm value. By aligning themselves with shareholders in 
these battles, unions inevitably shift from an antagonistic player to 
a strategically cooperative player in corporate governance. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1 
1996 LABOR SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 
Company Sponsor Proposal Status 
Albertson's Teamsters Repeal classified board 32.3% 
Alumax Laborers Repeal classified board 68.6% (p) 
Aiza Laborers Repeal classified board withdrawn 
American Stores Teamsters Redeem or vote on poison pill withdrawn 
Baker Hughes UBCJA Redeem or vote on poison pill 73.4% (p) 
Baltimore Gas Long View Restrict nonemployee 
& Electric director pensions not in proxy 
Bankers Trust NY Laborers No director liability exemption , withdrawn 
Bausch & Lomb UBCJA No director liability exemption withdrawn 
Operating Engineers Repeal classified board not in proxy 
Bell Atlantic Teamsters Redeem or vote on poison pill omitted ( c-10) 
CWA Cumulative voting not in proxy 
C\VA-Hammond Directors/candidates attend 
annual meeting 24.7% 
Boeing Teamsters Redeem or vote on poison pill withdrawn 
Cablevision Service Employees Confidential voting withdrawn 
Caterpillar UBCJA Repeal classified board 49.2% 
Chase Manhattan Teamsters Redeem or vote on poison pill withdrawn 
Chevron UBCJA Redeem or vote on poison pill not in proxy 
Compaq Computer Teamsters Redeem or vote on poison pill omitted ( c-10) 
Conrail Service Employees Redeem or vote on poison pill withdrawn 
Consolidated 
Natural Gas Long View Redeem or vote on poison pill 50.8% 
Dow Jones IAPE Allow union representative 
on board omitted ( c-8) 
Eastman Kodak Teamsters Cumulative voting 27.3% 
Fleming Teamsters Redeem or vote on poison pill 64.0% (p) 
Forest Laboratories Service Employees Redeem or vote on poison pill not in proxy 
GTE !BEW-Langlais Cap executive compensation 22.4% 
!BEW-Davis Cap executive compensation 22.1% 
General Electric Teamsters Restrict nonemployee 
director pensions omitted (c-11) 
C\VA Restrict nonemployee 
director pensions not in proxy 
General Instruments Service Employees Repeal classified board [1] 86.2% (p) 
Houston Industries Teamsters Redeem or vote on poison pill withdrawn 
Kimberly-Clark UBCJA Repeal classified board withdrawn 
Kmart Laborers Cumulative voting 29.3% 
Teamsters, UNITE Repeal classified board 43.1% 
Teamsters, UNITE Restrict nonemployee 
director pensions 29.8% 
Teamsters, UNITE Study sale of company 13.0% 
Knight-Ridder Laborers Redeem or vote on poison pill 39.2% 
Lockheed Martin Operating Engineers Vote on future poison pills not in proxy 
Louisiana Pacific Long View Repeal classified board 43.2% 
McGraw-Hill Laborers Repeal classified board withdrawn 
Mead Paperworkers Repeal classified board withdrawn 
UBCJA Vote on future golden parachutes 50.8% 
Melville Laborers Repeal classified board withdrawn 
Mercantile Stores Long View Repeal classified board 30.4% 
Merrill Lynch Laborers Repeal classified board 32.2% 
3M Teamsters Reincorporate in Minnesota 2.3% 
Mobil Service Employees Redeem or vote on poison pill withdrawn 
NorAm Energy Long View Vote on future golden parachutes withdrawn 
Panhandle Eastern OCAW-Miller Confidential voting not in proxy 
OCAW-Rule Redeem or vote on poison pill not in proxy 
OCAW-Sipe Vote on future golden parachutes 44.6% 
OCAW-Smith Repeal classified board 51.0% 
OCAW-Merrill Repeal fair price 49.3% 
Penney (J.C.) UNITE Redeem or vote on poison pill 40.6% 
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Pfizer Service Employees Redeem or vote on poison pill not in proxy 
Philip Morris Operating Engineers Restrict nonemployee 
director pensions withdrawn 
Rite Aid Long View Redeem or vote on poison pill [2] 
Sears, Roebuck Teamsters Separate chair and CEO withdrawn 
Sprint !BEW Restrict nonemployee 
director pensions 34.8% 
CWA Create shareholder committee 6.6% 
Super Yalu Long View Redeem or vote on poison pill 64.8% (p) 
Tenneco UBCJA No director liability exemption withdrawn 
Teamsters Redeem or vote on poison pill 37.4% 
T11ne Warner Teamsters Separate chair and CEO 17.9% 
Toys 'R' Us Teamsters Confidential voting not in proxy 
Transamerica Teamsters Redeem or vote on poison pill 32.2% 
Union Pacific UBCJA Repeal classified board withdrawn 
Unocal Service Employees Use Council of Institutional 
Investors' board policies omitted (c-10) 
Teamsters Separate chair and CEO withdrawn 
Upjohn Operating Engineers Restrict nonemployee 
director pensions withdrawn 
WMX Technologies Operating Engineers Prohibit director conflict 
of interest 30.7% 
Teamsters Repeal classified board 45.6% 
Wellman UNITE Redeem or vote on poison pill 44.6% 
Weyerhauser Long View Redeem or vote on poison pill 52.3% (p) 
Wheelabrator 
Technologies Operating Engineers Repeal classified board 17.7% 
Woolworth Long View Repeal classified board [3] 
[1] This proposal was supported by management. 
[2] The company indicated in its SEC filings that this proposal passed, but gave no vote counts. 
[3] The annual meeting was held June 13, 1996. Information regarding status was not found. 
Legend: 
(p) 
CWA 
IAPE 
!BEW 
Laborers 
Long View 
OCAW 
Operating 
Engineers 
Paperworkers 
Service 
Employees 
Teamsters 
UBCJA 
UNITE 
Passed 
Communication Workers of America 
Independent Association of Publishers' Employees 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
Laborers' International Union of North America 
Amalgamated Bank of New York LongView Collective Investment Fund 
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union 
International Union of Operating Engineers 
United Paperworkers International Union 
Service Employees International Union 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
Pension funds affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners of America 
Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (formerly ACfWU) 
Source: Checklist of 1996 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 114, supplemented with information from 
companies' 10-Q filings where data on shareholder votes were unavailable at the time the IRRC 
Bulletin was published. Where votes were added, they were calculated as (for)/(for + against) 
(abstentions were not included). 
We note that there are some inconsistencies between the information contained in the company's 
proxy statements and that in the IRRC Bulletin. In our tables, we have chosen to use the IRRC 
data where available in order to maintain consistency. 
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TABLE 2 
1997 LABOR SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 
Company 
AT&T 
Albertson's 
Amoco 
Ashland 
Baltimore Gas & Electric 
Bell Atlantic 
Boise Cascade 
Caraustar Industries 
Caterpillar 
Chase Manhattan 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Dayton Hudson 
DuPont(E.I.) de Nemours 
Eastman Kodak 
Enron 
Fleming 
Frontier 
Fruit of the Loom 
GATX 
General Electric 
General Motors 
Georgia Pacific 
Home Depot 
Illinois Tool Works 
International Paper 
Limited 
Merck 
Mobil 
Monsanto 
Penney (J.C.) 
PepsiCo 
Philip Morris 
Quaker Oats 
RJR Nabisco 
Sears, Roebuck 
Sprint 
Stone Container 
TRW 
Tenneco 
Texaco 
Tribune 
Union Camp 
Unisys 
WMX Technologies 
Westinghouse Electric 
Weyerhauser 
\Vtllamette Industries 
Legend: 
CWA 
IBEW 
Laborers 
Long View 
OCAW 
Sponsor 
CWA-lrvine 
Teamsters 
Service Employees 
OCAW-Brown 
Long View 
CWA-Rucker 
Operating Engineers 
Teamsters 
Paperworkers 
UAW-Lazarowitz 
Teamsters 
Long View 
Long View 
UBCJA 
Teamsters 
Operating Engineers 
Teamsters 
UBCJA 
C\VA 
Long View 
Paperworkers 
Teamsters 
Teamsters 
UBCJA 
Teamsters 
Paperworkers 
UBCJA 
Long View 
UBCJA 
Teamsters 
UBCJA 
UBCJA 
Teamsters 
Teamsters 
Long View 
Teamsters 
Teamsters 
CWA-Speight 
IBEW 
Teamsters 
Paperworkers 
Operating Engineers 
Teamsters 
Teamsters 
Tuamsters 
Paperworkers 
Operating Engineers 
Operating Engineers 
Operating Engineers 
Long View 
Paperworkers 
Proposal 
Cumulative voting 
Repeal classified board 
Separate chair and CEO 
Allow an employee on the board 
Restrict nonemployee director pensions 
Cumulative voting 
Cumulative voting 
Repeal classified board 
Repeal classified board 
Restrict nonemployee director pensions 
Separate chair and CEO 
Redeem or vote on poison pill 
Redeem or vote on poison pill 
Independent nominating committee 
Repeal classified board 
Cumulative voting 
Redeem or vote on poison pill (By­
Law) 
Repeal classified board 
Vote on future golden parachutes 
Redeem or vote on poison pill 
Vote on future golden parachutes 
Limit deferred compensation/OBRA 
Link director pay to performance 
Repeal classified board 
Separate chair and CEO 
Separate chair and CEO 
Vote on future golden parachutes 
Link executive pay to overseas 
labor standards 
Confidential voting 
No option cash in within 6 mos. 
of major layoff 
Redeem or vote on poison pill 
Restrict nonemployee director pensions 
Limit deferred compensation/OBRA 
Independent compensation committee 
Redeem or vote on poison pill 
Link director pay to performance 
Repeal classified board 
Cap executive pay to employee 
pay increase 
Restrict nonemployee director pensions 
Repeal classified board 
Limit relatives on the board 
Redeem or vote on poison pill 
Repeal classified board 
Repeal classified board 
Repeal classified board 
Repeal classified board 
Repeal classified board 
Prohibit director conflict of interest 
Redeem or vote on poison pill 
Redeem or vote on poison pill 
Repeal classified board 
Communication Workers of America 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
Laborers' International Union of North America 
Amalgamated Bank of New York LongView Collective Investment 
Fund 
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union 
1094 
Operating 
Engineers 
Paperworkers 
Service 
Employees 
Teamsters 
UAW 
UBCJA 
Michigan Law Review 
International Union of Operating Engineers 
United Paperworkers International Union 
Service Employees International Union 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
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International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agriculturnl 
Implement Workers of America 
Pension funds affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
and Joiners of America 
Source: Checklist of 1997 Shareholder Proposals, supra note 109. 
TABLE 3 
ACTIVITIES OF LoCAL 99R, UNITED FOOD AND 
COMMERCIAL WORKERS 
1996 Season 
Company Proposnl Status 
Albertson's Confidentinl voting 21.4% 
Idaho Power Confidentinl voting 14.1% 
Pier 1 Imports Confidentinl voting 44.6% 
Pope & Tnlbot Confidentinl voting .1% 
Vote on future golden parachutes not presented 
Questar Confidential voting 37.9% 
Vote on future golden parachutes 22.0% 
Tektronics Repeal classified board 34.3% 
Vote on future golden parachutes 8.8% 
Redeem or vote on poison pill 34.0% 
Source: IRRC, 1996 SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 4. 
1997 Season 
Company 
Albertson's 
Boeing 
Proposal 
Confidential voting 
Repeal classified board 
Boise Cascade Repenl classified board 
Heritage Media Confidential voting 
Pier 1 Imports Redeem or vote on poison pill 
Questar Repeal classified board 
TIS Mortgage 
Notes 
company advised UFCW will not present at meeting 
[1] 
another identical proposnl under 14a-8 in prol!}' 
material [2] 
union has indicated it will not independently solicit 
[3] 
no mention in proJ!Y materials that the UFCW locnl 
intends to present a proposal [4] 
[1] Albertson's, Inc., Definitive ProJ!Y Statement 29 (Apr. 8, 1997), available in EDGAR, Film No. 
97,576,512. 
[2] Boeing Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Mar. 14, 1997), available in EDGAR, Film No. 97,556,332. 
[3] Questar Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Apr. 7, 1997), available in EDGAR, Film No. 97,575,768. 
[4] TIS Mortage Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Apr. 23, 1997) available in EDGAR, Film No. 
97,585,820. 
Source: CoUNCIL OF lNSTL. INvEsroRS LEITER, supra note 26, at 2; preliminary prol!}' statements. 
